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INTRODUCTION 
Every month, Gallup asks Americans an open-ended question: “What 
do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?” 
From 1993 to 2005, the percentage of Americans who responded with 
“immigration” generally hovered around 3%.1  But after steadily 
increasing for the last fifteen years, more than 20% of Americans now 
regularly identify immigration as their top concern, with a record-
breaking plurality of 27% identifying it as the number one problem in July 
2019.2  
Few issues divide Americans like immigration.  Recent polling shows 
Americans are almost equally divided in thirds as to whether the total 
number of legal immigrants allowed in the country each year should be 
increased, decreased, or kept the same.3  Given such polarized views, it is 
unsurprising that for the last three decades the federal government has 
been mostly unable to alter the system, even though numerous major and 
minor reforms have been put forward by Democratic and Republican 
politicians over the years.4 
In theory, the United States has a structure in place to deal with such 
gridlock: federalism.  Federalism “assures a decentralized government 
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; 
it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; 
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it 
makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition 
for a mobile citizenry.”5  The current U.S. immigration regime—
complicated and intractable at the federal level—would clearly benefit 
from the flexibility, engagement, experimentation, and accountability that 
 
 1. Jeffrey M. Jones, New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important Problem, GALLUP (June 
21, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/259103/new-high-say-immigration-important-problem.aspx.  
 2. Id.  For comparison, in the same time period, only about 15% of Americans, on average, 
identified the economy as their chief concern. See Most Important Problem, GALLUP (Dec. 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx. 
 3. Jones, supra note 1. 
 4. See Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, The U.S. Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (July 25, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0 (summarizing recent 
actions and proposals from both the executive and legislative branches to reform the U.S. immigration 
system); see also infra notes 13, 35, 42, and 73. 
 5. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 454 (1991). 
2
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federalism promises. 
But in practice, based on long-held beliefs that the immigration powers 
are exclusively held by the federal government, the states have mostly 
been excluded from immigration decision-making: “Policies pertaining to 
the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted 
exclusively to Congress. [This] has become about as firmly imbedded in 
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government.”6 
This Article challenges these assumptions by advocating for an 
increased role for the states at the outset of the immigrant admission 
process.  The authority to issue permanent and temporary visas should be 
devolved to the state governments.  States would be empowered to adjust 
the types of visas that exist, varying their requirements, their lengths, and 
their availability.  And while the federal government would still set a cap 
on the total number of visas available each year,7 states could trade visas 
with one another, creating market incentives that, in the long-term, would 
provide Congress with tangible, verifiable data regarding the optimal 
number of visas to authorize.  
Such a system would allow states to become the primary policy drivers 
in determining whether the United States should care more about family 
reunification or labor market needs or refugee resettlement.  States could 
create entirely new visas for the graduates of in-state colleges or the 
victims of violence abroad.  Or states could deploy visas to incentivize 
growth in new industries or the redevelopment of struggling regions.  
Rather than advocate any particular change in visa durations or types, this 
Article contends that a wider diversity of visas throughout the country is 
an invaluable end in and of itself.  
The traditional view that immigration is a purely federal power should 
not be a barrier to this proposal.  On the contrary, this Article 
demonstrates that delegating immigration powers to the states is both 
good policy and entirely consistent with the United States Constitution.8  
 While many scholars have examined the intersection of federalism and 
immigration policy, very few have ever advocated for states to take the 
lead in exercising immigrant admission powers.  Instead, most articles 
have focused on the role that states should or should not play in enforcing 
existing immigration laws.9  Others oppose any state involvement in the 
 
 6. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
 7. For a brief discussion of whether it would be preferable to abolish visa caps altogether, see 
infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part IV.  
 9. See generally Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008) (discussing the ability of states to control immigration through 
states’ traditional police powers over family law and criminal law); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and 
Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012) (arguing that 
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immigration arena whatsoever,10 or recognize that although states will 
inevitably be involved in immigration policy, the benefits of such 
involvement are outweighed by the risks of state-led discrimination or 
mistreatment.11  
Only one law review note has actively advocated delegating significant 
authority over immigrant admissions to the states.  That proposal, 
however, was limited to employment visas.12  Similarly, members of 
Congress and a few state legislatures have also occasionally floated the 
idea of involving states in the visa process, but again, these proposals have 
been limited to just a few categories of visas, typically involving 
temporary guestworkers.13 
 
states and localities that exercise immigration enforcement powers threaten immigrants’ civil rights); 
David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 
81 (2013) (arguing that courts have interpreted federal preemption too broadly in the context of 
immigration law, and that greater state involvement in immigration enforcement actions should be 
allowed); Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1 (2010) (advocating for the creation of regional, rather than state-based, immigration policies, subject to 
federal oversight); Anne B. Chandler, Why is the Policeman Asking for my Visa?, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT'L L. 209 (2008) (concluding that localities likely have the constitutional right to engage in immigration 
enforcement actions); Note, States’ Commandeered Convictions: States Should Get a Veto Over Crime-
Based Deportation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2322 (2019) (arguing for an increased role for the states in 
preventing resident undocumented immigrants from being deported).  
 10. See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2011) (arguing that state involvement in immigration law 
does not lead to the benefits typically ascribed to state-based policymaking, such as experimentation or 
innovation); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal 
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (arguing that federal immigration powers can 
never be constitutionally delegated to the states). 
 11. See Stella Burch Elias, The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 
353, 402 (2016) (arguing that “nascent attempts at state engagement in refugee- and asylee-related 
rulemaking are precarious” and urging courts to recognize “firm constitutional limits that prevent states 
from promulgating laws and developing policies designed to exclude refugees”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, 
The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 572 (2008) (arguing 
that an exclusively federal system “prevents us from harnessing the value of the federal-state-local 
dynamic on immigration matters,” while still acknowledging that “efficiency and coherence require 
federal control over the formal admissions and removal processes”); Stella Burch Elias, Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform(s): Immigration Regulation, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 37, 79-81 (2014) (discussing efforts 
in Germany, Australia, and Canada to devolve immigrant admission powers to subfederal actors, and 
concluding that any increased role for states in the American system would require that “the federal 
government . . . retain[] ultimate responsibility for admissions determinations”). 
 12. See Davon Collins, Note, Toward a More Federalist Employment-Based Immigration System, 
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 350 (2007) (calling on Congress to “affirmatively decentralize to the states 
administrative control over employment-based (EB) immigration decision-making”).  A second law 
review article has called for an even more narrow delegation, allowing states to experiment with 
alternative types of agriculture guestworker visas.  See Julia Jagow, Comment, Dairy Farms and H-2A 
Harms: How Present Immigration Policy is Hurting Wisconsin and Immigrant Workers , 2019 WIS. L. 
REV. 1269 (2019).  To be clear, these proposals would represent good first steps.  But by limiting the 
types of visas available, states would have limited flexibility.  This Article, accordingly, seeks a more 
expansive decentralization.  
 13. State Sponsored Visa Pilot Program Act of 2019, H.R. 5174, 116th Cong. (2019); Jagow, supra 
note 12, at 1294 (“[T]hirteen different states have considered legislation that would create individual state-
4
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This Article, by contrast, is a first-of-its-kind proposal to delegate 
power over nearly all types of visas, both permanent and temporary, to 
the states. Part I begins by reviewing the current immigration regime in 
the United States, with an emphasis on its flaws and the need for reform.  
Part II lays out a plan to replace the current visa system with one in which 
most types of visas are distributed to the states.  The states can then 
disburse the visas to prospective immigrants as they see fit, or sell their 
allotment to other states if they prefer. In Part III, the Article turns to the 
ways in which this proposal’s benefits are rooted in the principles of 
federalism and the free market.  Finally, in Part IV, the Article addresses 
potential constitutional concerns and political critiques of the proposal. 
I. THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION SYSTEM AND ITS FLAWS 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
complained that the federal immigration system bears a “striking 
resemblance” to “King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete;” its structure 
demonstrates “Congress’s ingenuity in passing statutes certain to 
accelerate the aging process of judges.”14  Or, to borrow another ancient 
metaphor, the immigration system is like the unsolvable Gordian knot.15  
It is the unenviable task of this Part to try and untangle this existing 
immigration regime, discussing both how it functions currently and 
how—in the view of many—it falls short.16  
 
based guest worker programs for foreign workers and/or initiatives for undocumented residents to gain 
status through work in industries that traditionally attract guest workers, such as agriculture or the service 
industry.”).  See also Alex Nowrasteh, Why We Need State-Based Immigration Visas, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-why-we-need-state-based-
immigration-visas-20191120-2r2u6fcoxzdevkaidm2iifwhye-story.html; David Bier, State-Sponsored 
Visas: New Bill Lets States Invite Foreign Workers, Entrepreneurs, and Investors, CATO INST. (May 11, 
2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/state-sponsored-visas-new-
bill-lets-states-invite. 
 14. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 15. What's Next After an Immigration Deal Goes Bust?, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/What-s-next-after-an-immigration-deal-
goes-bust-12501946.php (“For a brief, shining moment it seemed as if Washington was on the verge of 
untangling the political Gordian Knot of immigration reform.”); Karen Grigsby Bates, Undocumented 
Immigrants in Calif. Will Benefit From New Laws, NPR (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/10/07/230183623/undocumented-immigrants-in-calif-
will-benefit-from-new-laws (“The federal government remains shut down over a budget stalemate, but 
California’s Gov. Jerry Brown decided not to wait for Congress to make decisions on the Gordian knot 
that is U.S. immigration policy.”).  
 16. A lengthy article could be (and often has been) devoted to a single critique of a single type of 
visa.  This Article does not take a normative position on the merits of any of the criticisms it highlights.  
Rather, it suggests that devolving the question to the states will allow different parts of the country to 
weigh each criticism and experiment with different solutions. 
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A. An Overview 
The United States currently issues over 200 different types of visas,17 
not including the status offered to asylees or refugees, who are governed 
by a separate system.18  Visas come in two varieties: nonimmigrant and 
immigrant.  Nonimmigrant visas are referred to in this Article as 
temporary visas, because they allow foreign nationals to enter the United 
States for only limited periods of time and for limited purposes.  These 
visas can vary in length dramatically.  On the low end, for example, the 
crewmembers who staff ships and planes may enter the United States for 
up to twenty-nine days (D visas) and the fiancés of U.S. citizens may 
remain here for ninety days (K visas).  At the other extreme, certain 
temporary workers may stay in the United States for up to six years (H 
visas), while ambassadors, NATO personnel, and foreign representatives 
to the United Nations may remain in the United States for as long as their 
home government requests (A, C, NATO, and G visas).19  
Immigrant visas, by contrast, have no time limit; therefore, this Article 
refers to them as permanent visas. The word “visa” technically refers only 
to the travel permit stamped into a passport,20 but an immigrant who 
receives a permanent visa is also given a Green Card, which makes them 
a legal permanent resident (“LPR”).21  As an LPR, they become eligible 
for U.S. citizenship after meeting certain time limit and background check 
requirements.22  For ease, this Article uses “permanent visa” to refer to 
 
 17. 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2013); 22 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2014). 
 18. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1156 (governing immigrant visas) with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 
(governing refugees and asylum seekers).  
 19. See generally ILONA BRAY & RICHARD LINK, U.S. IMMIGRATION MADE EASY 184, 352-55, 
357-61, 394 (NOLO 19th ed. 2019); see also Ilona Bray, How Long Will Your Visa Allow You to Stay?, 
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-long-will-your-us-visa-allow-you-stay.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
 20. Christine Chester & Amanda Cully, Putting a Plug in America’s Brain Drain: A Proposal to 
Increase U.S. Retention of Foreign Students Post-Graduation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 385, 388 
(2011) (“The term ‘visa’ refers to ‘a travel permit stamped into a [foreign] passport . . . that allows [an] 
alien . . . to travel to [and from the United States].’”) (alterations in original). 
 21. Id.; see also CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42048, NUMERICAL LIMITS ON 
PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE PER-COUNTRY CEILINGS 1 (2016) 
(using the terms “permanent immigrant” and “LPR” interchangeably, and generally discussing the 
division of duties between the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security for overseeing 
both the visa-issuing process and the Green-Card-issuing process); KATHERINE WITSMAN, OFF. IMMIGR. 
STAT., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS 2 (2018) (“Once issued an immigrant 
visa, a foreign national may seek admission to the United States and become an LPR when admitted at a 
port of entry.”).  
 22. BRAY & LINK, supra note 19, at 50-51, 167, 170-73.  Many of the individuals who become 
LPRs already live in the United States at the time they receive a Green Card because they are already in 
the country on a temporary visa or as a prospective asylum seeker. For these individuals, the process of 
becoming an LPR is referred to as an “adjustment of status.”  See Chester & Cully, supra note 20, at 388; 
WITSMAN, supra note 21, at 2.  The State Department is responsible for issuing and tracking visas issued 
6
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this entire process: the permission to travel to the United States, the LPR 
status, and, ultimately, citizenship.  
While the sheer number of different types of visas can seem 
overwhelming, the vast majority of immigrants to the United States fall 
within just a few categories. The following Subparts address in more 
detail the number of visas distributed each year and the requirements for 
obtaining these visas. 
B.  Permanent Visas 
1. Visa Allocations 
 The federal government uses complex formulas to determine how 
many permanent visas to issue each year. In theory, Congress has 
authorized 675,000 permanent visas per year. But in practice, the number 
is always much higher because certain visa categories are not subject to 
any annual caps. The actual number of visas issued each year is typically 
about one million.23  
More specifically, each year, the United States provides an unlimited 
number of permanent visas to the immediate family members of U.S. 
citizens (defined as spouses, minor children, and, in some cases, parents), 
 
to potential immigrants who are abroad, while the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for 
overseeing adjustments of status that occur internally, making it difficult to track the precise number of 
new LPRs each year.  See ARGUETA, supra note 21, at 1 (for general information) & at 8 (for a discussion 
of inconsistencies between the State Department’s numbers and the Department of Homeland Security’s 
numbers).  But for this Article’s purposes, the distinction between visas issued abroad and adjustments of 
status occurring in the United States is irrelevant, except to note that under the current system, the number 
of adjustments of status are included when calculating how many visas are issued each year.  So, for 
example, although approximately 140,000 permanent employment visas are authorized by law each year 
(see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d)(1)(A)), the State Department reports that only 27,345 such visas were issued in 
2018. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2018, TABLE I IMMIGRANT AND 
NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 (2018), available 
at 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018AnnualReport/FY18Annual
Report%20-%20TableI.pdf.  But separately, the State Department confirmed that the number of visas 
combined with the number of adjustments of status equaled 139,483, or roughly the 140,000 authorized 
for that year.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2018, TABLE V IMMIGRANT VISAS 
ISSUED AND ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2018), 
available at 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018AnnualReport/FY18Annual
Report%20-%20TableV.pdf.  Accordingly, for convenience, this Article uses “permanent visas” to refer 
both to visas issued abroad and to adjustments of status issued at home when discussing the annual caps 
on visa categories. 
 23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(A)(1), (d)(1)(a), (e); see also ARGUETA, supra note 21, at 2.   A 
more detailed explanation of how visa disbursements are calculated is provided in WILLIAM A. KANDEL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42866, PERMANENT LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY 
OVERVIEW 2-7 (2018). 
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totaling an average of about 470,000 visas per year.24  It then issues about 
226,000 visas to non-immediate relatives, 140,000 visas to employer-
sponsored immigrants, and 55,000 diversity visas to immigrants from 
historically underrepresented countries.25 
 Many of these categories are further subdivided.  For example, of the 
226,000 family-sponsored visas available, 23,400 are designated for the 
unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens; 23,400 are for the married adult 
children of U.S. citizens; 114,200 are for the spouses, minor children, and 
unmarried adult children of LPRs; and 65,000 are for the siblings of U.S. 
citizens.26  Meanwhile, for employer-sponsored immigrants, 40,040 of the 
available visas go to immigrants with “extraordinary abilities”; 40,040 are 
for professionals with advanced degrees; 40,040 are for skilled or 
unskilled workers; 9,940 are for “special immigrants,” such as religious 
ministers; and 9,940 are for investors who agree to invest at least one 
million dollars in the U.S. economy.27  Finally, diversity visas are 
reallocated each year based on the country of origin of immigrants who 
have been admitted to the United States over the last five years.  “The 
formula generally results in the allocation of approximately 24,000 
diversity visas for the European region, 20,000 for the African region, 
7,000 for the Asian region, 2,500 for the Latin American and Caribbean 
region, less than 1,000 to the Oceania region, and 8 to the North American 
region.”28  
 
 24. The number of immediate relative visas issued each year is not subject to any annual cap, see 
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), meaning it fluctuates each year.  On average, between 2001 and 2017, 
471,807 immediate family members became LPRs each year. U.S. Dep’t HOMELAND SEC., OFF. IMMIGR. 
STAT., 2018 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (Oct. 2019), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook (hereinafter “YEARBOOK”).  The numbers ranged 
from a low of 331,286 in 2003 to a high of 580,348 in 2006. But 2003 represents a significant aberration—
it is the only year in the period where the number fell below 400,000.  Id. 
 25. These numbers are all set by statute in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(B)(ii), (d)(1)(a),; & (e).  Note 
that 226,000 visas per year is the minimum number of non-immediate relative visas allowed. The statue 
actually authorizes a maximum of 480,000 for this category each year. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(A) 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(B).  But visas beyond the minimum amount do not become available unless 
the number of immediate-relative visas issued in the same period falls below 254,000. As that has not 
occurred since at least 1996, the 226,000 minimum has also effectively become the annual maximum. 
YEARBOOK, supra note 24. 
 26. KANDEL, supra note 23, at 5.  
 27. Id.  Note that while this Article occasionally uses the phrase “unskilled” workers, as is common 
in both the academic literature and the law itself, there are reasons to believe the phrase should be retired.  
See, e.g., Brittany Bronson, Do We Value Low-Skilled Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/opinion/do-we-value-low-skilled-work.html; Allana Akhtar, A 
Tweet from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Convinced Me I’ve been Using the Wrong Word to Describe 
Waitresses. Here’s Why I’ll Never Call Them ‘Unskilled’ Again, BUS. INSIDER (July 28, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-unskilled-labor-perpetuates-stereotypes-about-gender-education-
2019-7. 
 28. Andowah A. Newton, Note, Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy: The Diversity 
Visa Program and the Missing Discourse on its Impact on African Immigration to the United States , 38 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1049, 1055 (2005). 
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In addition to the above categories, a certain number of refugees and 
asylees become LPRs each year.29  “Refugees are admitted to the United 
States from abroad while asylees are foreign nationals who request and 
receive asylum after having entered the United States.  The number of 
refugees admitted each year is determined by the President in consultation 
with Congress. The number of asylees is not limited.”30  On average, 
between 2001 and 2017, 95,000 refugees and 42,000 asylees became 
LPRs each year.31 
Accordingly, in any given year, the United States may provide 
permanent visas as follows: 32 
 
Immediate family member visas 470,000 46% 
Other family-sponsored visas 226,000 22% 
Employer-sponsored visas 140,000 14% 
Diversity visas 55,000 5% 
Refugees 95,000 9% 
Asylees 42,000 4% 
TOTAL: 1,028,000 100% 
 
 
 29. As noted above, refugees and asylees are not generally treated as part of the immigrant visa 
regime.  But because refugees and asylees are entitled to request LPR and ultimately become U.S. citizens, 
they are included here.  See supra note 18. 
 30. See KANDEL, supra note 23, at 3 n.16. 
 31. See YEARBOOK, supra note 24.  This reflects the number receiving LPR status each year, which 
is different from the number admitted to the country in a given year, as refugees and asylees must reside 
in the United States for one year before becoming LPRs.  See WITSMAN, supra note 21, at 4. These 
averages are likely to be significantly lower in the coming years, due to both the lower refugee totals 
imposed by the Trump Administration for 2018 and 2019 (see, e.g., Bobby Allyn, Trump Administration 
Drastically Cuts Number Of Refugees Allowed To Enter the U.S., NPR (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764839236/trump-administration-drastically-cuts-number-of-refugees-
allowed-to-enter-the-u), and its various policies limiting the number of asylees admitted each year (see 
Nicole Narea, The Demise of America’s Asylum System Under Trump, Explained, VOX (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/11/5/20947938/asylum-system-trump-demise-mexico-el-salvador-honduras-
guatemala-immigration-court-border-ice-cbp).  And immigration numbers for all categories are likely to 
be significantly lower in 2020 due to the federal government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic.  See 
Proclamation No. 10,014, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 29, 2020); Proclamation No. 10,052, 85 Fed. Reg. 
38,263 (June 22, 2020).  
 32. These figures are necessarily an oversimplification.  They represent a hypothetical allocation 
based on averages, rather than the raw numbers of any single year.  They also only cover the most 
numerous permanent visa categories; if smaller visas were included, the percentages would change 
slightly.  For example, about 20,000 SI and SQ visas were issued in 2017 to Iraqis and Afghans who 
cooperated with the United States during its wars in those countries. These represent about 1.5% of the 
total number of permanent visas issued that year. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., 2017 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 18-19, TABLE 6. PERSONS OBTAINING LAWFUL PERMANENT 
RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND MAJOR CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEARS 2015 TO 2017 (July 2019), 
available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/table6. Incorporating these 
relatively small numbers into the above analysis would reduce each of the percentages in the chart by 
about 0.25%. 
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Many critics argue these allocations are unwise.  Perhaps the most 
common complaint is that the United States wrongfully prioritizes family-
based immigration over employment or merit-based immigration.  The 
Trump Administration, for example, proposed completely reorienting the 
system around employment: instead of allocating approximately 68% of 
visas to immediate family members and other relatives, it would have set 
aside only 33% for family reunification.  Meanwhile, it would have 
increased employment-based visas to 57%, removed the diversity visa 
entirely, and reduced the number of refugee and asylee LPRs from 13% 
combined to 10% combined.33  Notably, the bipartisan comprehensive 
immigration reform plan that passed the Senate in 2013 would have led 
to a similar, though less dramatic, readjustment from family visas to 
employment visas.34 
Of course, there are others who advocate for either retaining or 
expanding family-centric immigration.  For example, recent bills 
introduced by congressional Democrats have proposed moving the 
immediate relatives of LPRs, who are currently limited to 114,200 visas 
per year, to the same category as the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, 
which is not subject to any cap.  If this proposal were adopted, the number 
of immediate family member visas would increase, while the number of 
visas going to other relatives would remain roughly the same because 
visas that would have gone to the immediate relatives of LPRs would 
instead go to other non-immediate relative categories, such as adult 
children and siblings.  The result would be a net increase in the number 
of family-based visas issued each year, both in terms of raw numbers and 
as a percentage of all visas issued.35  
 
 33. Yamiche Alcindor, What’s in Trump’s Immigration Proposal, PBS (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/whats-in-trumps-immigration-proposal; for an example of 
criticisms of this proposal, see John Fritze, Trump Immigration Plan Sidesteps Immigrants Here Illegally, 
Draws Wide Criticism From Both Sides, USA TODAY (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/16/donald-trump-immigration-plan-does-not-
address-illegal-immigration/3692319002/; Julie Grace Brufke, Pelosi: Trump Immigration Plan is ‘Dead 
on Arrival,’ THE HILL (May 16, 2019), https://thehill.com/latino/444155-pelosi-trump-immigration-plan-
is-dead-on-arrival. 
 34. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 
113th Cong. (2013).  The bill would have reduced the number of family-sponsored visas from 226,000 to 
161,000 (§ 2304) and would have eliminated the diversity visa entirely (§ 2303), while creating between 
120,000 and 250,000 new merit-based visas for each year (in addition to the 140,000 employment visas 
that already exist), depending on the unemployment rate in the United States (§ 2301). After passing the 
Senate, the House of Representatives declined to take up the bill. See Why Immigration Reform Died in 
Congress, NBC NEWS (July 1, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/why-immigration-
reform-died-congress-n145276.  
 35. See Resolving Extended Limbo for Immigrant Employees and Families Act, S. 2603, 116th 
Cong. (2019); Reunited Families Act, H.R. 4944, 115th Cong. (2018).  Allowing an unlimited number of 
visas for the immediate family members of LPRs was also contemplated by the 2013 Senate reform (see 
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2305 (2013)), but as noted, that bill also would have reduced the number of other 
family-sponsored visas available and created more merit-based visas, so it most likely would not have led 
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These are just some of the most expansive changes that have been 
proposed.  Many other smaller proposals have been put forward as well.  
Some want to see the percentage of diversity visas increased, even if it 
comes at the expense of family-based or employer-based visas.36  Others 
argue that the United States should admit more skilled and unskilled 
workers, while reducing the number of visas reserved for workers with 
“extraordinary” skills or advanced professional degrees.37  And some of 
the most contentious debates involve how many refugees the United 
States should accept.38 
In addition to caps on certain categories of visas, many permanent visas 
are also subject to country-of-origin caps.  No more than 7% of all family-
based visas (excluding the immediate family members of U.S. citizens), 
employment-based visas, or diversity visas can go to immigrants from a 
single country in any given year.  This is typically what Americans think 
of when referring to a “waiting list” or “backlog.” to legally enter the 
United States.39  For example, as of December 2019, the State Department 
was still processing visa requests from the unmarried, adult children of 
U.S. citizens that were filed in May 2013 (for Chinese and Indian 
nationals), November 2008 (for Filipinos), and August 1997 (for Mexican 
applicants).40  Other relatives, such as married children, must wait even 
 
to an overall increase in the percentage of visas going to family members.  
 36. See Newton, supra note 28, at 1078 (“[A] significantly larger amount of visas should be 
allocated to the diversity visa program.  This can be accomplished by increasing the total amount of 
immigrant visas available or by reallocating some of the visas currently allocated for family and 
employment-based visas.”). 
 37. Kayleigh Scalzo, Note, American Idol: The Domestic and International Implications of 
Preferencing the Highly Educated and Highly Skilled in U.S. Immigration Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
926, 943-45 (2011) (criticizing the U.S. preference for highly skilled immigrants over unskilled workers); 
Anita Ortiz Maddali, Left Behind: The Dying Principle of Family Reunification Under Immigration Law, 
50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 107, 139 (2016) (discussing how the focus on skilled immigrant workers favors 
male immigrants over women and children).  
 38. See David Kampf, Keeping Refugees Out Makes the United States Less Safe, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/13/keeping-refugees-out-makes-the-united-states-
less-safe/; Stephen Yale-Loehr & Aaron El Sabrout, Make America Great Again: Admit More Refugees 
to the U.S., CORNELL L. SCHOOL, https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/Make-America-Great-
Again-Admit-More-Refugees-to-the-US.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2021); Andrew Vitelli, Should the US 
Accept Syrian Refugees, THE PERSPECTIVE (2019), https://www.theperspective.com/debates/politics/us-
accept-syrian-refugees/; see also Allyn, supra note 31; Narea, supra note 31; Alcindor, supra note 33. 
 39. See, e.g., Nicole Nixon, Why ‘Waiting In Line’ For Legal Immigration Status Can Take Years, 
KUER 90.1 (Apr. 12, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.kuer.org/post/why-waiting-line-legal-immigration-
status-can-take-years#stream/0; David Bier, Immigration Wait Times from Quotas Have Doubled: Green 
Card Backlogs Are Long, Growing, and Inequitable, CATO INST. (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/immigration-wait-times-quotas-have-doubled-green-
card-backlogs-are-long; Adam Barsouk, Illegal Immigrants Jump the Line, Making Legal Immigrants 
Wait, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 02, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/illegal-
immigrants-jump-the-line-making-legal-immigrants-wait.  
 40. Visas Bulletin, DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 2019), 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_december2019.pdf.  Note that although 
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longer: applications from China go back to 2007; applications from India 
go back to 2004; applications from the Philippines go back to 1998; and 
applications from Mexico go back to 1996.  Meanwhile, for certain 
employment categories, the State Department is still processing 
applications from 2008 and 2009 for Chinese and Indian workers.41 
There have been many calls to raise or eliminate the per-country caps 
altogether—even if the total number of visas issued each year remains 
unchanged—because these provisions disproportionately affect just a few 
countries.  In late 2019, a bipartisan proposal to increase the caps from 
7% to 15% in some categories, and to remove the caps entirely in other 
categories, passed the House of Representatives and appeared likely to 
become law.  However, at the last moment, the bill failed to advance in 
the Senate.42 
2. Visa Requirements 
 In addition to criticisms about the allocation of visas, there are also 
criticisms about the qualifications necessary to obtain certain visas.  
 For example, “immediate relatives”—the group receiving the most 
visas from the United States each year—refers only to “the children, 
spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that, in the 
case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age.”43 
Additionally, “children” is defined as an unmarried person under twenty-
one years of age.44  This means that a minor citizen cannot sponsor their 
parent and that the unmarried or married adult children of citizens, the 
siblings of citizens, and the spouses, children, and parents of LPRs are all 
excluded from the “immediate relative” definition.  These potential 
immigrants must instead pursue other family-sponsored visas, which have 
strict annual caps.45 
Perhaps the current definition of immediate relative is reasonable, but 
it is not the only reasonable definition. For example, some have argued 
that the current definition causes unfair problems for widows whose U.S.-
 
the State Department refers to these as “F1” visas in the Visa Bulletin, that designation is not the official 
name; rather, they are F11 or B11 visas. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2013). 
 41. Visas Bulletin, supra note 40. 
 42. Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act, H.R. 1044, 116th Cong. (2019); Fairness for High-
Skilled Immigrants Act, S. 386, 116th Cong. (2019); Nicole Narea, A Rare Bipartisan Agreement on 
Immigration Reform Has Tanked in the Senate, VOX (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/9/19/20873985/bipartisan-immigration-green-card-bill-senate; David Bier, Fairness for 
High Skilled Immigrants Act: Wait Times and Green Card Grants, CATO INST. (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/fairness-high-skilled-immigrants-act-wait-times-green-card-grants.  
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).  
 44. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).  
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(4).  
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citizen-spouse dies prematurely.46  Others have argued that minor 
children should be allowed to sponsor their parents, which was permitted 
until 1976.47  And there have been criticisms about how these definitions 
treat same-sex partners,48 women in abusive relationships,49 and 
stepfamilies.50  More radically, some argue that the changing definition 
of “family” in the modern world requires a wholesale rethinking of the 
concept as it applies to immigration law, with child welfare being 
prioritized over biological ties.51 
Or consider employee visas.  Permanent employment visas, like family 
visas, are divided into different categories, with more visas available for 
those immigrants who qualify for categories that are seen as most 
beneficial to the United States’ economy:  
First preference is reserved for what are commonly known as “priority 
workers,” more specifically, “persons of extraordinary ability in the 
sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics; outstanding professors or 
researchers; and multinational executives and managers.” Qualification as 
a person of extraordinary ability in one of these fields is “demonstrated by 
sustained national or international acclaim and . . . achievements [which] 
have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation.” 
Second preference is given to aliens “who are members of the professions 
holding advanced degrees or for persons with exceptional ability in the arts, 
sciences, or business.” Under this category, possession of a degree is 
evidence of exceptional ability, but is insufficient by itself. The third 
preference “is reserved for professionals, skilled workers, and other 
workers.” Fourth preference is afforded to “special immigrants,” including 
 
 46. See, e.g., Shaina Elias, Note, From Bereavement to Banishment: The Deportation of Surviving 
Alien Spouses Under the “Widow Penalty,” 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172 (2008); Melanie Hui Lipana, 
Note, The Reality for Noncitizen Widows, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1493 (2012). 
 47. See Maddali, supra note 37, at 170-71.  
 48. See Laura Figueroa & Angelica Jimenez, The Slow, Yet Long-Anticipated Death of DOMA and 
its Impact on Immigration Law, 16 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 547 (2014); JonCarlo 
Serna, Comment, Same-Sex Bi-National Couples: The Benefits and Pitfalls of Judicial Evolution and the 
Validity of Marriage, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 591 (2015); Kate Shoemaker, 
Comment, Post-Deportation Remedy and Windsor’s Promise, 63 UCLA L. REV. 168 (2016).  
 49. See Margaret M.R. O’Herron, Note, Ending the Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act, 7 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 549 (1993); Albertina Antognini, Family Unity Revisited: Divorce, Separation, and Death 
in Immigration Law, 66 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing generally the intersection of separation, divorce, 
and death with immigration law).  
 50. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in Federal Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 514 (1987).  
 51. See Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: 
Towards a Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 
COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 509, 510 (2010) (“[E]ven where the United States aims to further family unity, 
it fails to do so because U.S. immigration law reflects a legal construction of the ‘family’ concept that is 
largely premised on biology, is grounded in the traditional conception of a nuclear family, and excludes 
what this Article calls ‘functional’ families: formations which may not satisfy this narrow conception of 
family, but satisfy the care-taking needs of children.”).  For a similar argument, see Monique Lee 
Hawthorne, Comment, Family Unity in Immigration Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809 (2007). 
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“religious workers, employees of U.S. foreign service posts, [and] retired 
employees of international organizations.” The fifth and final preference 
category is reserved for investors.52 
In each instance, an immigrant must meet the standards of the visa 
itself; e.g., must have “extraordinary ability” or have an “advanced 
degree” or be a “religious worker,” depending on the category for which 
they are applying.  But those who are part of the second or third preference 
must also obtain a labor certification, meaning their employer-to-be must 
first file an application with the Department of Labor demonstrating that:  
(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and 
available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United 
States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or 
unskilled labor, and 
 
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and 
working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.53 
 These labor certifications have been criticized from all sides.  Some 
argue that it is an unnecessarily burdensome process that ultimately does 
little to fulfill its stated purpose—protecting U.S. workers.54  Others, by 
contrast, note that the Supreme Court has “often recognized that a 
‘primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for 
American workers,’”55 and that the labor certification process should be 
made more stringent in order to achieve that goal.56  
 
 52. Chester & Cully, supra note 20, at 392-93 (citations omitted).  
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II). 
 54. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 
1310-11 (2012) (referring to the current labor requirements as “nonsensical”); Collins, supra note 12, at 
358 (“[W]hile protecting American labor and ensuring that foreign labor is turned to only as a last resort 
can be seen as a reasonable, even laudable, goal, the system arguably fails even at that. While a rigorous 
and cumbersome labor certification system may protect domestic labor by discouraging applications and 
artificially keeping admissions below quota . . . , its complexity and susceptibility to employers willing to 
game the system fail to protect American workers.”).  See also Shang-Tzu (Peter) Hwu, Alien Labor 
Certification: A “Shell Game” for United States Workers, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 367 (1991); 
Heather L. Brown, Comment, The Paradoxical Nature of the Department of Labor’s Labor Certification 
Procedures as Applied to Self-Employed Aliens, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 43 (1993).  
 55. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrant Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991).  
 56. Jessica Shaver, Obama Administration Changes to H-2A Visa Program: A Temporary Fix to 
a Permanent Problem, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 97, 98-99 (2009) (summarizing criticisms of Bush 
Administration changes to the certification process that were considered insufficiently protective of 
American workers); Seth R. Leech & Emma Greenwood, Keeping America Competitive: A Proposal to 
Eliminate the Employment-Based Immigrant Visa Quota, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 322, 349-50 (2010) 
(warning that certain proposals to “remove[] the element of labor certification” could harm the “domestic 
labor force,” and arguing further that the labor certification process is superior to a points-based system 
at protecting American workers); Dean Baker, Silicon Valley Needs to Quit Whining About H1-B Visas, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/02/09/h1-b-silicon-valley-tech/ (suggesting, in the 
context of temporary visas, that tech companies should only be able to hire foreign workers if they first 
show that they have increased the number of African Americans and women working for their firms).  
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The fifth permanent employment visa category is the subject of debate 
as well.  Some have called for the expansion of EB-5 investment visas57 
or for the creation of entirely new investor visas,58 while others have 
called on Congress to tighten the requirements for investor visas so that 
rich foreigners cannot just “buy” American citizenship.59 
Finally, no permanent immigrant category has been as controversial in 
recent years as the admission of refugees and asylees. One report 
criticized the Trump Administration for not only reducing the total 
number of refugees, but also for attempting to prioritize religious refugees 
while deprioritizing orphans, among other changes.60  There have also 
been calls to create new refugee categories, such as for those fleeing 
climate change,61 gender-based discrimination,62 or violations of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63  Similarly, in the asylum 
context, the Trump Administration moved to limit those seeking asylum 
based on domestic violence or gang violence, which sparked significant 
criticism.64 
 
 57. Leslie K. L. Thiele & Scott T. Decker, Residence in the United States Through Investment: 
Reality or Chimera, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 103, 147-48 (2010). 
 58. David P. Weber, Halting the Deportation of Businesses: A Pragmatic Paradigm for Dealing 
with Success, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 765, 794 (2009). 
 59. Taylor C. Byrley, Note, Selling Citizenship to the Highest Bidder: A Proposal to Reform the 
United States EB-5 Investor Visa Program, 27 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79 (2017).  
 60. Kristie de Peña & Matthew La Corte, The Devil is in the Details: Digging Deeper into 2020 
Refugee Resettlement Changes, THE NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-devil-is-in-the-details-digging-deeper-into-2020-refugee-
resettlement-changes/. 
 61. Ryan Wangman, Ed Markey Wants US to Admit At Least 50,000 Refugees a Year Fleeing 
Climate Change, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2019/09/27/markey-wants-admit-least-refugees-year-
fleeing-climate-change/gIufscMs1k6RLM3zCJPuDJ/story.html; but see Kara K. Moberg, Note, 
Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary 
Protection, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1131 (2009) (arguing that the current refugee and asylum system is ill-
suited to deal with climate refugees).  
 62. Mattie L. Stevens, Note, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender 
as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179 (1993).  
 63. Michael J. Parrish, Note, Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a Basis for Refugee Protection, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 223 (2000).  
 64. Priscilla Alvarez, DOJ Defends Rule Ending Asylum Protections for Domestic Violence 
Victims, CNN (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/09/politics/asylum-protections-domestic-
violence-appeals-court/index.html; Emily Moss, Who Is a Refugee, HARV. POL. REV. (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/who-is-a-refugee/; Matt Zapotosky, Judge Strikes Down Trump 
Administration Effort to Deny Asylum for Migrants Fleeing Gang Violence, Domestic Abuse, WASH. POST 
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C. Temporary Visas 
 The situation with temporary visas is similar.  Out of approximately 
nine million temporary visas issued in 2018, about 6.7 million were for 
tourists or short-term business visits (B visas), and another 300,000 were 
for brief entries by airplane and ship crewmembers (C and D visas). 65  Of 
the remaining two million temporary visas, about 1.1 million were for 
temporary work visas (H, J, or L visas) and another 400,000 were for 
students (F and M Visas). The remaining visas went, in decreasing order 
of prevalence, to: officials with foreign governments or international 
organizations like the United Nations, NATO, and NAFTA (A, G, I, 
NAFTA, and NATO visas); persons with “extraordinary” abilities in the 
sciences, arts, education, or business, as well as (less extraordinary) 
athletes and artists (O and P visas); treaty-specific trade workers (E visas); 
the fiancés of U.S. citizens (K visas); religious leaders (R visas); workers 
travelling to the Northern Mariana Islands (CW visas), cultural exchange 
visitors (Q visas); certain crime victims (U visas); and the victims of 
human trafficking (T visas). 66  
Like with permanent visas, there are many criticisms leveled against 
how temporary visas are allocated and who is eligible.67  For example, 
few issues are as heavily debated as the appropriate number of temporary 
work visas.  The number of H1-B visas for specialty workers (often used 
in the tech industry),68 H2-A visas for temporary agricultural workers, and 
 
 65. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2018, TABLE XVI CLASSES OF 
NONIMMIGRANTS ISSUED VISAS (INCLUDING BORDER CROSSING CARDS) FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 
(2018), available at 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018AnnualReport/FY18Annual
Report%20-%20TableXVIA.pdf.  
 66. See supra note 65. 
 67. Reserving some visas for workers willing to live in the Northern Mariana Islands, a U.S. 
territory, represents a unique problem that may or may not fall within this Article’s proposal.  On the one 
hand, there is no particular reason that U.S. territories could not be treated like states, receiving a share of 
visas to distribute as they see fit.  On the other hand, given the unique relationship between territories and 
the federal government, it would be unsurprising if the federal government insisted on maintaining control 
over territory-specific visas. 
 68. See Roger Waldinger & Christopher L. Erickson, Temporarily Foreign? The Labor Market 
for Migrant Professionals in High-Tech at the Peak of the Boom, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 463 (2003); 
Leah Phelps Carpenter, Comment, The Status of H-1B Visa in These Conflicting Times, 10 TULSA J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 553, 578 (2003) (summarizing criticisms of the H-1B visa); Stephen Moore, U.S. Needs More 
Brainiac Immigrants, So Let’s Boost H1B Visas, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/04/19/stephen-moore-u-s-needs-more-brainiac-
immigrants-so-let-s-boost-h1b-visas/ (calling for more H1-B visas); L. Francis Cissna, New Regulation 
Will Make H-1B Visa Program More Effective, CNN (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/12/opinions/regulation-will-make-h-1b-program-more-effective-
cissna/index.html (calling for H1-B visas to be allocated primarily to graduates of U.S. schools); Michael 
Hiltzik, Stephen Moore, Trump’s Pick for the Fed, Just Got a Key Immigration Program Dead Wrong , 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-moore-fed-visas-
20190422-story.html (calling the H1-B program a “cynical sham” because it takes jobs from Americans).  
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H2-B visas for unskilled workers are debated year after year.69  There 
have also been calls for stricter minimum wages for guestworkers;70 
limiting the number of visas available to tech companies unless they first 
make progress in hiring more women and people of color;71 expanding 
labor protections for farmworkers;72 and allowing greater flexibility for 
temporary workers to switch jobs without having to leave the United 
States and start the process over.73 
 The student visa system is also a subject of discussion.  Some  advocate 
an easier process for international students to apply to U.S. college 
programs or for keeping students in the United States, even on a 
temporary basis, after they graduate.74  Others have criticized the system 
for imposing barriers that prevent poorer students from participating in 
the program.75  But the student visa system has also been attacked for 
being exploited by some of the terrorists involved in the September 11, 
2001 attacks and for providing an avenue for the theft of U.S. trade 
secrets.76  There have also been highly publicized scandals regarding 
 
 69. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44849, H-2A AND H-2B TEMPORARY WORKER 
VISAS: POLICY AND RELATED ISSUES (2020) (providing a summary of how the H-2A program works and 
what policy considerations are involved in determining qualifications for the visa); Bruce Talbott, Our 
Fruit is Rotting in the Trees as Laborers are Kept out of the Country, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-fruit-is-rotting-in-the-trees-as-laborers-are-kept-out-of-
the-country/2018/08/24/bf119ad6-a6e6-11e8-8fac-12e98c13528d_story.html (calling for an increase in 
the number of temporary agricultural workers allowed each year); Camilla Benoni & Ben Bira, Open 
Forum: H-2A Visa Helps Farmers but also Widens Door for Labor Abuses, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Open-Forum-H-2A-visa-helps-farmers-but-
also-13789929.php (criticizing the lack of safeguards in the H2-A program); Alex Nowrasteh, Offer More 
Visas to People Coming Across the Southern Border, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-offer-more-visas-to-people-coming-across-the-
southern-border-20190820-cxvqjuky5ralnggcteu2b6f2ky-story.html (calling for additional visas to be 
allocated to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to stem the flow of illegal border crossings). 
 70. See Kate Cimini, This Trump Rule Change Will Mean Lower Wages for Farmworkers, CAL 
MATTERS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://calmatters.org/california-divide/2019/10/this-trump-rule-change-will-
mean-lower-wages-for-farmworkers/. 
 71. Baker, supra note 56. 
 72. See Alison K. Guernsey, Note, Double Denial: How Both the DOL and Organized Labor Fair 
Domestic Agricultural Workers in the Face of H-2A, 93 IOWA L. REV. 277 (2007).  
 73. See Charles C. Mathes, Note, The Department of Labor’s Changing Policies Toward the H-
2B Temporary Worker Program: Primarily for the Benefit of Nobody, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1801 (2012) 
(calling for visa portability for temporary workers); see also Agricultural Guestworker Act, H.R. 4092, 
115th Cong. (2018); Farm Workforce Modernization Act, H.R. 5038, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 74. See Marnette Federis, Visa Rules are Restricting the Future of International Students in the 
US, PRI (June 20, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-20/visa-rules-are-restricting-future-
international-students-us; Alia Wong, Colleges Face Growing International Student-Visa Issues, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/09/how-harvard-and-
other-colleges-grapple-student-visa-problems/597409/; Chester, supra note 20. 
 75. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 
HOW. L.J. 237, 257-58 (1994).  
 76. See Erin N. Grubbs, Academic Espionage: Striking the Balance Between Open and 
Collaborative Universities and Protecting National Security, 20 N.C. J. L. & TECH. ON. 235 (2019); 
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diploma mills used to help foreign students illegitimately enter the 
country, as well as fake schools established by the United States itself to 
ensnare foreign students in fraud claims.77  
 In fact, virtually every temporary visa category comes with criticisms 
or proposed reforms, including fiancé visas,78 athlete and artist visas,79 
and religious worker visas.80  
Accordingly, as with permanent visas, there are more proposals for 
changes to the temporary visa system than Congress can plausibly debate, 
let alone enact.81  The purpose of this Article is not to endorse or oppose 
any of these proposals.  Rather, the goal is to emphasize that our current 
system has proven ill-equipped to address any of these complaints, 
whatever normative position one takes on them, and that a change to a 
state-based system would at least plausibly provide an opportunity to 
experiment with some of these ideas. 
II. THE PROPOSAL 
What if most immigrant admissions decisions—what types of visas to 
issue, what requirements to impose for each visa, and how to allocate 
visas among different groups of applicants—were instead made by the 
individual states?  While King Minos’s labyrinth and the Gordian knot 
are useful allegories to express that something is a complicated or 
impenetrable problem, the moral of each story is actually that the simplest 
 
Topher Greene, Note, The Importance of Improving U.S. Immigration Law and the Changes Made Since 
9-11, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 101, 120 (2006). 
 77. See Christopher S. Collins & T. Richmond McPherson, III, How Tri-Valley University Fell Off 
the Diploma Mill: Student Immigration and Façade Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 525 (2012); Elizabeth 
Redden, A Fake University, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/12/10/who-went-fake-university-farmington-and-why. 
 78. See Christina L. Pollard, Here Come Many More Mail-Order Brides: Why IMBRA Fails 
Women Escaping the Russian Federation, 46 CAP. U. L. REV. 609 (2018) (calling for greater restrictions 
on fiancé visas to prevent mail-order bride abuses); Ivan A. Pavlenko, Note, Statutory Purpose and 
Deferring to Agency Interpretations of Laws: The Immigrant Law Paradigm: Aged Out, 63 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 147 (2012) (discussing the challenges faced by minor children who seek to accompany parents who 
have received a fiancé visas).  
 79. See Kevin K. McCormick, Note, Extraordinary Ability and the English Premier League: The 
Immigration, Adjudication, and Place of Alien Athletes in American and English Society , 39 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 541 (2004); Heather E. Morrow, Comment, The Wide World of Sports is Getting Wider: A Look at 
Drafting Foreign Players into U.S. Professional Sports, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 649 (2004); Marissa Crespo, 
The Final Curtain Call: Administrative Challenges in the United States O-Visa Process for Foreign 
Artists and Performers, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 101 (2012); Scalzo, supra note 37.  
 80. See Greene, supra note 76 (arguing that the religious worker visa is susceptible to fraud by 
would-be terrorists); Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Immigration Reform, 35 CATH. LAW. 259, 267 (1994) 
(questioning whether religious worker visas could be used to hire employees for private hospitals or 
parochial schools).  
 81. For examples of states innovating in areas where Congress has declined to legislate, see infra 
note 113.  
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solution is often the best way through the morass.82  Although there may 
be no easy answer to all that ails the United States’ immigration system, 
devolving a portion of the federal government’s immigration powers to 
the states is at least one plausible solution that could cut through the 
inertia.  This Part lays out the details of how this proposal would work in 
practice and provides examples of the likely benefits of such a radically 
different system.  
A. Permanent Visas 
The proposal is relatively straightforward.  Congress would establish a 
set number of permanent immigrant visas to be issued each year and 
would then allocate a share of those visas to each state, to distribute, trade, 
or let expire as that state pleases. 
This Article does not take a position on the exact formula to be used 
for the initial distribution among the states.  Each state could start with 
the same amount, or it could be based on population, state GDP, 
immigration history, or some other calculation.83  The precise formula is 
not important because, under this proposal, no matter how the visas are 
initially distributed, they will end up in the right place.  So long as states 
have the right to sell their visas to one another, the states with the greatest 
need or desire for visas will ultimately get them.84 
 
 82. In the former myth, Theseus escaped the labyrinth by unraveling a ball of thread as he walked, 
allowing him to later retrace his steps out. Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation: 
Equipping Public Defenders to Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 564 n.130 
(2004). In the latter myth, “Alexander the Great . . ., frustrated with his inability to untangle the knot, 
simply sliced through it with his sword.” Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit 
Bias in Jury Selection, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 151 n.3 (2010).  
 83. The pilot program for employment visas proposed by Rep. John Curtis, for example, would 
give each state a base of 5,000 visas, while dividing an additional 245,000 visas among the states based 
on total population.  See Bier, supra note 13.  Davon Collins’ employment devolution proposal, by 
contrast, suggests distributing the visas based on either population or past immigration levels. See Collins, 
supra note 12, at 361 (“A system of initial visa distribution based on population would disadvantage states 
that currently receive a disproportionate share of immigrants, such as California.  However, the precise 
manner of distribution is not critical to the proposal, as long as the system is widely considered to be fair 
and equitable. (Thus, another option could be to base distribution on past immigration levels.)”).  
 84. This is, essentially, a restatement of the Coase theorem, which has been described as “the 
single greatest intellectual event in the modern law & economics movement.”  Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 782 (1989-90).  Stated briefly: 
[T]he Coase theorem admits of no singular definition . . . If one can, however, speak of a “typical” 
statement of the Coase theorem, it might go something like this: If transaction costs are zero and 
property rights over the relevant resources are well-defined, parties involved in an externality 
situation will bargain to an efficient and invariant resolution, regardless of to whom the property 
rights are initially assigned.  So stated, the theorem embodies two assumptions and two 
conclusions.  The theorem embodies the assumptions that property rights are well defined and the 
costs of transacting are zero.  The conclusions that emerge are that the resulting allocation of 
resources will be efficient and that this result will be invariant across alternative assignments of 
rights. 
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 Once the initial allocation is made, the states would be free to 
determine how to distribute those visas.  One state could prioritize family 
reunification, another could prioritize employment, a third could 
prioritize diversity visas, and a fourth could prioritize refugees.  Perhaps 
even more radically, the states could change the requirements for the visas 
altogether.  Assume, for example, that State A, State B, and State C all 
want to continue issuing visas in roughly the same ratio as they are issued 
now, meaning that about 50% of all permanent visas go to the immediate 
family members of U.S. citizens.  State A could change the definition of 
“immediate relative” to include a broader range of family members, such 
as the parents of minor citizens or a citizen’s married or unmarried adult 
children.  State B could expand the definition to include the immediate 
relatives of LPRs.  Meanwhile, State C could expand the definition of 
immediate relative to encompass those who fall outside the historical 
model of nuclear families: unmarried partners, widows and widowers, 
stepfamily members, or women who would have been eligible for a visa 
but for a divorce necessitated by domestic violence.  
 Similar possibilities exist in the employment context.  One state could 
abolish the requirement that businesses try to hire an American before 
making a job offer to a foreign worker based on a belief that doing so 
would create a fairer, more open, and more competitive labor market. 
Another state could do the opposite—out of a desire to prevent 
immigrants from undercutting American labor, it could require that 
businesses pay exorbitant fees to get employee visas or mandate a 
significant salary and benefits package to any foreign worker, thereby 
incentivizing the hiring of Americans.  Or, to be even more aggressive, 
one state could designate a certain number of visas to a specific industry 
to try and lure businesses from another state.  Nevada, for example, could 
set aside a certain number of employment visas for new corporations, as 
part of its ongoing effort to lure corporations away from Delaware; 
 
Steven G. Medema, Juris Prudence: Calabresi’s Uneasy Relationship with the Coase Theorem, 77 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 66 (2014).  Of course, the Coase theorem is not without its critics. See, e.g., 
Hovenkamp, supra, at 786 nn.11 & 12; see also Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: Through a Glass 
Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1994). While the Coase theorem suggests that it does not really matter 
how visas are initially distributed, so long as the property right—the right to buy or sell visas—is clearly 
defined, the best starting point for the allocation of visas would likely be past immigration levels. This 
would allow Congress to estimate, as closely as possible, each state’s potential need or desire  for 
immigrants.  Any proposal that veers too far from such an allocation would cause an economic windfall 
to the states with more limited interests in immigration.  For example, if 10% of all new immigrants from 
the last five years settled in State A, and 0.5% of all new immigrants settled in State B, it would make 
little sense to allocate the same number of visas to each of these states.  Otherwise, State A would have 
essentially no choice but to purchase visas from other states just to match the immigration levels it enjoyed 
before the decentralization of the visa program.  For more information about the intersection between the 
ability of states to purchase or sell visas and the likely distribution of immigrants throughout the United 
States, see infra Part IV(B)(1)-(2). 
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Georgia could provide visas for the film industry, as part of its ongoing 
competition with Hollywood.85  
 States could also move certain visas from the temporary category to the 
permanent category.  For example, in 1999, Congress created a specific 
guestworker visa for nurses, but imposed so many limits on who could 
apply and how many visas could be issued that, as a practical matter, only 
a handful of new nurses were admitted to the United States.86  In a Note 
calling for states to be in charge of such visas, Davon Collins persuasively 
argued that if employment visa determinations were made at the state 
level, states like Florida, “with large, growing populations of retirees” 
could “decid[e] that recruiting nurses was a long-term goal” and could 
prioritize providing permanent visas to “the global supply of willing 
immigrant nurses and trainees.”87  
 Other states could create entirely new permanent visas.  One state could 
provide a temporary visa to students attending in-state colleges, with a 
promise that a permanent visa would automatically be available upon 
graduation.  Other states could harness immigration incentives to combat 
rural flight by promising a permanent immigration visa to those who agree 
to live or work for a certain number of years in an economically depressed 
region.88  
 Perhaps most importantly, under this proposal, the burden would fall 
on the states, rather than the federal government, to address the ongoing 
limbo of undocumented immigrants already in the United States.  It would 
be up to the states to finally decide whether it is more important to admit 
new immigrants or to provide permanent visas (with the associated 
benefits of LPR status and, eventually, citizenship) to undocumented 
immigrants already here.  One state could provide visas only to the 
undocumented immigrants known as “Dreamers,” meaning young 
immigrants who were illegally brought into the United States when they 
were minors.89  Another could allocate some or all of its permanent visas 
to undocumented immigrants who have lived in the state for one, two, or 
five years in an effort, however slow, to provide stability and status for 
 
 85. See J. Weston Phippen, Nevada, a Tax Haven for Only $174, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/04/panama-papers-nevada/476994/; Eliana 
Dockterman, How Georgia Became the Hollywood of the South, TIME (July 26, 2018), 
https://time.com/longform/hollywood-in-georgia/. 
 86. See Collins, supra note 12, at 376-77.  
 87. Id.  
 88. For more on this type of proposal, see Silva Mathema, Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, & Anneliese 
Hermann, Revival and Opportunity, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/09/02/455269/revival-and-
opportunity/. 
 89. See Joanna Walters, What is Daca and Who are the Dreamers?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/04/donald-trump-what-is-daca-dreamers. 
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undocumented immigrants.  Or perhaps no state would support any type 
of pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, in which case—
if nothing else—we would better understand our real priorities as a 
nation.90  
 This list is not meant to be exhaustive.  On the contrary, the benefit of 
devolving immigrant admission decisions to the states is that each state 
could pursue its own priorities and innovate to determine what works best 
for them.  Any number of proposals—not just the above—could be tried 
by states who have the political will or economic need to do so.  
B. Temporary Visas 
 This Article’s proposal for temporary visas is essentially identical to its 
proposal for permanent visas, with one important difference relating to 
duration.  Temporary visas, as they currently exist, vary dramatically in 
terms of length.  In the guestworker context, H1-B visas have a three-year 
term, with a possible extension to six years; H1-C visas have a three-year 
term with no possibility of extension; and H2-A and H2-B visas have a 
one-year term, with a possible extension to three years.  Meanwhile, 
academic exchange programs—J visas—last anywhere from six months 
to five years, depending on the program. And athletes under a P visa have 
a ten-year maximum, while artists under the same visa have no 
maximum.91 
 Because of these variations, it would be difficult for the federal 
government to simply give states a set number of temporary visas to hand 
out.  One main goal of federalism is increased flexibility, which means 
states need to have the discretion to change the amount of time available 
for certain visas.  One state may want to give fiancés a year-long visa; 
others may want to cap student visas at four years or six years.  But if a 
state were simply given 1,000 temporary visas and told to allocate them 
as it wished, a state could turn all 1,000 visas into ninety-nine-year-long 
“temporary” visas, effectively cheating the system and expanding its pool 
of permanent visas.92  
This Article’s solution is to allocate to the states not a specific number 
of visas, but a specific number of months.  Suppose, for example, that 
State A and State B were each given 1,000 months to be distributed 
 
 90. See infra Part IV(B)(3). 
 91. See supra note 19. 
 92. Of course, allowing states to pursue this option would still provide Congress with useful 
information about the states’ needs or desires for more permanent immigrants.  Accordingly, while ways 
to avoid this outcome are discussed next, a proposal that allowed states to have this much flexibility could 
also be workable.    
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through any number of temporary visas.93 State A could take just under 
half of those months (480) and divvy them up into four-year visas for 
students (e.g., it would issue ten visas lasting forty-eight months each). 
State A could then take most of the remaining months—504, to be 
specific—and divvy them up into three-year visas for temporary workers 
(e.g., it would issue fourteen visas lasting thirty-six months each).  The 
remaining sixteen months could then be distributed for shorter durations, 
such as for foreign professors seeking to teach for a single semester, or 
they could be sold to other states.  
State B, by contrast, could decide that no temporary visa, regardless of 
category, should last longer than twelve months.  It could issue eighty-
three visas, each lasting twelve months.  Students who want to continue 
their education or workers who want to remain at their jobs would then 
have to reapply each year to get an additional twelve-month visa.  In this 
hypothetical, State B would be left with four extra months, which could 
be sold or used for other limited purposes. 
Aside from this distinction—giving the states months rather than 
visas—the proposal for temporary visas is the same as the proposal for 
permanent visas.  States could use trial and error to determine how many 
temporary farmworkers they need versus how many temporary 
technology workers.  They could adjust or abolish rules that limit 
guestworkers from working for multiple employers, allowing greater 
flexibility for immigrants to stay in the United States while seeking new 
jobs.  They could expand or restrict what programs qualify for student 
visas.  In short, our immigration system would become much more 
responsive to the needs of individual states and the political desires of 
local communities. 
C. Other Practical Considerations  
This Subpart briefly addresses certain practical questions that could, at 
least potentially, impede implementation of the proposal for a state-
controlled immigration system. 
 1.  What Role Would the Federal Government Continue to Play in 
this System?  
 While the stated goal of this Article is to delegate as much power as 
possible to the states with respect to immigrant admissions, there would 
clearly need to be a continued role for the federal government in several 
 
 93. Again, the actual number of months to be allocated is up for debate, but would ideally be linked 
to the number of temporary visa holders previously residing in the state.  See supra notes 83-84.  
23
Vanderhooft: Delegating Admission Powers to the States
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
2021] DELEGATING ADMISSION POWERS TO THE STATES 933 
 
areas.  This Subpart examines the distribution of certain duties between 
the federal government and the states.   
i. Background Checks   
At present, the federal government has certain standards that apply to 
all visa applicants: they must pass a Department of Homeland Security 
background check that reviews things like whether they have committed 
any crimes, whether they are likely to spread any dangerous diseases, or 
whether they have ever been affiliated with terrorist organizations.94  This 
inquiry, which is closely related to the safety and security of the United 
States writ large, could continue to be undertaken by the federal 
government.95  
But it also currently falls to the federal government to ensure that each 
applicant meets the requirements of their particular visa.  The federal 
government examines, for example, whether employers have completed 
the labor certification process, whether a marriage is legitimate, and 
whether a person meets the definition of a refugee.  Going forward, these 
determinations should instead be made by the states.  Once a state decides 
that someone meets the qualifications it has set for a visa, the federal 
government would honor that choice, issuing whatever temporary visa or 
permanent visa—with its concomitant LPR status and eventual right to 
citizenship—the state requests, rather than conduct its own independent 
investigation into whether the immigrant has satisfied the relevant visa 
requirements. 
 ii. Control over Certain Types of Visas 
Second, some visa categories would necessarily need to stay within the 
control of the federal government.  Most obviously, the requirements for 
obtaining a tourist visa are deeply entangled with foreign policy, with 
different requirements existing for citizens of different countries.96  And 
even without those foreign policy hurdles, it would be exceedingly 
 
 94. See BRAY & LINK, supra note 19, at 50-51, 167, 170-73. 
 95. Under the current system, those who fail their background check may still be entitled to a 
waiver in some instances. See BRAY & LINK, supra note 19, at 34-35, 62-63.  Purely in terms of what is 
most politically palatable, it would make sense under this proposal to continue reserving to the federal 
government the power to issue such waivers.  But it would also be possible to create a system where the 
federal government simply informs the sponsoring state of any background check problems, and then lets 
the state decide whether a waiver is appropriate.  
 96. At present, 39 countries participate in the Visa Waiver Program, which allows tourists from 
those nations to travel to the United States without a visa.  See Visa Waiver Program, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visa-waiver-program.html (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2021).  
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burdensome for an individual from Sweden hoping to visit the Grand 
Canyon, Las Vegas, and Disneyland all in one trip to obtain a tourist visa 
from Arizona, Nevada, and California, respectively. Visas for foreign 
officials, ambassadors, trade representatives, and sea and air 
crewmembers are, like tourist visas, so entangled with foreign policy and 
international bureaucracy that state involvement would be a hindrance, 
rather than a benefit.  Those visas should continue to be administered by 
the federal government.  
Another category of immigrants that is particularly difficult to 
incorporate into this system is asylum seekers.  Because asylees must first 
enter the United States before seeking relief (as opposed to refugees, who 
are vetted abroad before receiving a visa),97 devolving asylum decisions 
to the states would impose a significant burden on states along the 
Mexican border, where most asylees arrive,98 as these states would be 
under significant pressure to allocate a portion of their visas to asylees, 
while other states would feel no pressure to do so. 
To resolve this problem, the federal government should continue to 
maintain responsibility for overseeing asylum requests.  After all, under 
this proposal, nothing would change regarding the role of Customs and 
Border Protection in managing the United States’ ports of entry.  And as 
discussed in the next Subpart, enforcement—including removal 
proceedings through the Department of Justice’s immigration courts—
would also remain the same.  It would therefore make sense that when 
asylees present themselves to United States officials, the federal 
government would be responsible for determining whether the individuals 
are allowed to remain.  
Importantly, creating this carve out for asylum seekers would not 
prevent states from implementing their own, more generous visa 
programs for the same category of individuals.  For example, the Trump 
Administration was heavily criticized for barring victims of domestic 
violence or gang violence from obtaining asylum.99  Under this Article’s 
proposal, although the federal government would still be primarily 
 
 97. KANDEL, supra note 23, at 3. 
 98. Asylum requests may be made either affirmatively or defensively. Affirmative asylum requests 
occur when asylees voluntarily submit applications directly to asylum officials. Defensive asylum requests 
occur when undocumented aliens are placed in removal proceedings and make an asylum request for the 
first time as a defense to that process.  See NADWA MOSSAD, OFF. IMMIGR. STAT. ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: 
REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2018 5 (Oct. 2019).  In 2018, a total of 105,500 affirmative asylum applications 
were filed with the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 6. Of these 92,959—or 88%—were made at 
the U.S./Mexican border. See Claims of Fear, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/claims-fear. Data showing the origins of 
aliens making defensive asylum claims is unavailable, but is presumably less concentrated in the border 
states, because such claims are made by individuals who have been in the United States for a longer period 
of time.   
 99. See supra note 64. 
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responsible for asylum claims, a state that believed victims of domestic 
violence or gang violence should receive protection could counteract 
unpopular federal restrictions by setting aside some of its own visas for 
such immigrants.  In short, keeping the federal government involved 
ensures that no single state is burdened with asylum requests due to events 
beyond their control—namely their geography—while still providing 
states the freedom to embrace additional asylees, beyond the number 
admitted by the federal government, if their legislatures choose to do so.  
 2. Would States Have to be Responsible for Enforcement?  
In discussions about devolving immigration powers to the states, the 
most controversial issue is typically the ability of states to enforce federal 
immigration laws.  While few law review articles have addressed whether 
states could take a more active role in immigrant selection,100 many have 
debated the normative merits and constitutional questions around state 
involvement in immigration enforcement, up to and including 
deportation.101  
Interrogating all the issues that arise in the context of sub-federal 
immigration enforcement is beyond the scope of this Article.  Suffice it 
to say, for those wary of state-based enforcement—a position this Author 
shares—there is no apparent reason why devolving admission powers 
would also require devolving enforcement powers.  Under this proposal, 
the actual visas would still be issued by the State Department; it would 
simply be up to the states to decide who qualified for those visas.  
Additionally, all visa recipients would still be required to submit to a 
federal background check.  In other words, the federal government would 
have roughly the same information it already has—the identities of 
immigrants with visas and information about the length and terms of those 
visas.  It is true that, under this proposal, the federal government would 
need to remain apprised of the visa requirements imposed by the states to 
determine whether an immigrant no longer qualifies for a previously 
issued visa.  But as discussed in more detail below, the federal 
government already engages in such work under the current system.102  
In sum, the federal government would effectively be in the same 
position it currently holds with respect to enforcement, so there would be 
no need to permit (or mandate) state-based enforcement of immigration 
policy beyond the status quo.  Legitimate concerns raised by other 
scholars about state-based enforcement should not be a barrier to 
 
 100. See supra notes 11-12. 
 101. See supra notes 9-10. 
 102. See text accompanying infra notes 160-164 (discussing the many ways in which state laws—
such as family or criminal law—impact whether individuals may be deported).  
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embracing state-based admissions policies.  
 3.  What Would Happen to Immigrants Currently on the Waitlist?  
Finally, perhaps the most significant practical challenge to 
implementing this proposal is determining what to do with immigrants 
currently on visa waitlists.  As discussed above, immigrants from some 
countries have been on these waitlists since the late 1990s.  By one 
estimate, if nothing is done, some 675,000 immigrants-to-be will die 
before their application is processed.103 
There may be no legal impediment to simply starting the system over 
from scratch and ignoring those who have waited so long.  But pretending 
the waitlist never existed and forcing every applicant on the list to start 
over would be exceedingly unfair.  There are no easy solutions to this 
issue, but three imperfect ways of handling the waitlist are identified 
below.   
First, the simplest solution would be to clear the entire waitlist by 
temporarily (and dramatically) increasing the number of visas available 
for a period of approximately five years.104  Afterward, it would be up to 
the states to either craft systems that make waitlists unnecessary (by, for 
example, removing per-country caps) or administering their own 
waitlists.  
 The second solution is a slower version of the above, except that it does 
not require a dramatic increase in immigration.  A certain number of 
existing visas could be set aside for the federal government to continue 
issuing each year.  The sole purpose of these visas would be to eliminate 
the waitlist.  Depending on how it is structured, how many visas remain 
in federal control, and how many individuals abandon the waitlist in favor 
of applying instead for new visas made available by the states, the waitlist 
could theoretically be exhausted within about eight years.105  The problem 
here, however, is that without increasing the total number of visas, fewer 
 
 103. See Bier, supra note 39. 
 104. That was essentially how the problem would have been dealt with in the Senate’s 2013 
comprehensive reform bill.  See, Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2302(c)-(e) (2013); see also A Guide to S.744: Understanding 
the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 10, 2013), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senate-
immigration-bill.  
 105. Simply removing per-country caps without otherwise increasing the number of visas available 
is estimated to eliminate the waitlist in eight to ten years.  See Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act, 
H.R. 1044, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Stuart Anderson, Bill Aims to End Decades-Long Waits for High-
Skilled Immigrants, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/02/15/bill-aims-to-end-decades-long-waits-for-high-
skilled-immigrants/#2edd8de77b85 (explaining that this bill would end the employee visa backlog about 
five years after an initial three-year transition period).  
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visas would be available to allocate to the states, limiting states’ flexibility 
to create their own programs.  
 Finally, and perhaps most realistically, the federal government could 
simply abandon the waitlist while mandating that any immigrant on the 
list who files a new application for a state visa obtain priority.  
 Consider, for example, an unmarried Mexican adult who applied to be 
reunited with their U.S. citizen parents in 2000.  As of December 2019, 
the State Department was reviewing applications for Mexican nationals 
in that category from 1997,106 so our hypothetical immigrant is close to 
finally getting a visa after more than twenty years on the waiting list.  But 
if the reforms proposed in this Article had been enacted on January 1, 
2020, they would have to start all over in their family’s state of residence. 
The federal government could nevertheless mandate that their prior 
position on the waitlist be taken into account when they apply again.  If 
State A, where the citizen-parents live, decides to issue only employment-
based visas, our hypothetical immigrant is simply out of luck.  The best 
option would be for the parents to move to another state with a more pro-
family visa program.107  So the parents move to State B, which allocates 
a significant portion of its visas to family reunification, but continues to 
adhere to the 7% per country cap that currently exists under federal law.  
The immigrant would be free to submit an application in State B, and 
State B would be required to put that application ahead of most other 
applicants.  But if enough other prospective immigrants from Mexico 
with long-delayed applications also applied in that state, the 7% rule 
could delay for another year or two when the application would be 
granted.  So the parents instead move to State C, which is eager to provide 
family-based visas and has no per-country cap.  If the immigrant 
submitted their application in State C, that state would be required to treat 
that application as having been filed before nearly all other visas, and they 
would finally be permitted to come to the United States.  
This system would not be perfect.  An immigrant about to get off the 
federal waiting list would almost certainly feel robbed if they had to start 
over again at the state level—especially if, depending on the regime 
created by each state, their opportunity to immigrate decreases.  But it is 
worth noting that such a risk already exists under the status quo: a 
sponsoring relative could die prematurely or a prospective employer 
 
 106. See Visa Bulletin, supra note 40. 
 107. While this would be a major inconvenience, both for the waiting immigrant and for their 
parents, it is also—at least theoretically—how federalism is supposed to work.  The idea that individuals 
can “vote with their feet” is a well-established principle of federalism.  See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry”).  Accordingly, this may actually be a benefit of the proposal, as it 
forces states to compete for the support of citizens with divergent views on the ideal immigration scheme.  
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could go bankrupt, making a pending immigration application moot, no 
matter how long the immigrant had been on the waiting list.108  At least 
this option would provide some measure of opportunity to waiting 
applicants.  
Even if this Article has no perfect solution to the waitlist, it is still 
superior to keeping the current system.  The primary cause of the waitlist 
is the per-country caps, which Congress, despite occasional proposals, has 
been unable to repeal.109  But it is likely that at least some states, 
depending on their needs, would eliminate this cap if they had the power 
to do so.  Therefore, while this is admittedly a thorny issue, this Article’s 
proposal would still allow some states to enact a partial fix. 
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PROPOSAL 
Even though this Article’s proposal would represent a radical change 
in U.S. immigration law, it is based on concepts long embraced by the 
United States: federalism and a free market.  
 First, this proposal embodies many of the benefits historically ascribed 
to our federalist system of government.  It would, for example, allow “the 
states and the nation to remould, through experimentation, . . . our 
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic 
needs,” turning states into the laboratories of democracy once envisioned 
by Justice Brandeis.110  And it creates greater accountability by moving 
decision-making powers to a more local level:  
The . . . major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of state and local 
governments to draw citizens into the political process. The greater 
accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individuals to 
participate actively in governmental decisionmaking. This participation, in 
turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of 
democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and 
enhances voter confidence in the democratic process.111  
This increased activity at the local level is generally characterized as a 
 
 108. Immigration officials have some discretion to consider an immigration application even after 
the death of a sponsoring family member, but this applies to only a few types of applicants. See Antognini, 
supra note 49, at 37-42.  Additionally, the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act of 2000 
increased the portability of certain employment visas, meaning that there are some protections for 
immigrants that lose a job while on the waiting list, but even those protections are only available if the 
immigrant is first able to obtain a new job offer.  See Kristen Ness Ayers & Scott D. Syfert, U.S. Visa 
Options and Strategies for the Information Technology Industry, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 301, 
325-36, 330-31 (2001). 
 109. H.R. 4944, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 110. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).  
 111. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-
8 (1988) (internal citations omitted). 
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good in and of itself—a way to enhance our democracy.  Less charitably, 
and more cynically, moving power to states and local governments may 
insulate the federal government from the worst impulses of anti-
immigrant constituents.  After all, limiting such sentiment to the state 
level might be preferable to allowing anti-immigrant sentiment to flourish 
at the federal level:  
Federalism can also function as a steam-valve. In the immigration context, 
[Professor] Spiro has described this steam-valve effect as the capacity of 
‘those states harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act on those 
sentiments at the state level, thus diminishing any interest on their part to 
seek national legislation to similarly restrictionist ends.’ The absence of 
such a steam-valve in the immigration arena has been thought by some to 
be a contributing factor to the flashes of anti-immigration legislation at the 
national level, such as those that prompted the Chinese Exclusion Act. 
Presumably, areas with high anti-immigrant sentiment are unable to affect 
change at the local level, and thus forced to seek immigration restrictions 
in Congress. And due to the nature of political logrolling, a small interest 
group with an intense preference pitted against the neutral posture of other, 
larger groups may prevail in the legislature.112 
 Finally, as discussed at length above, there is no shortage of ideas 
regarding how the United States could restructure its immigration system, 
but it is incredibly rare for such changes to actually be adopted.  Giving 
power to the states increases the likelihood of at least some of these 
proposals being implemented.113  
Just as importantly, this Article’s proposal calls for visas to be traded 
among the states.  Therefore, in addition to all the other benefits of 
federalism, the proposal would bring market pressure to bear on the 
immigration system.114  
 
 112. Collins, supra note 12, at 386 (quoting Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration 
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1637-38 (1994)). 
 113. Merritt, supra note 111, at 6 (“[S]tate and local governments check federal authority by 
regulating areas that the federal government chooses to ignore.  When President Reagan vetoed a bill 
designed to alleviate the high rate of unemployment among American youth, cities and states around the 
country created more than thirty programs to employ teenagers in productive tasks.  Similarly, when the 
federal Food and Drug Administration refused to require fast-food chains to label their ingredients, New 
York and several other states compelled the chains to disclose that information.  And, although both the 
Department of Justice and the United States Commission on Civil Rights have rejected the concept of 
comparable worth, at least five states have adopted comparable-worth legislation and twenty-four others 
have shown interest in the idea.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 114. Many argue that this kind of market competition is at the heart of federalism: “The model of 
competitive federalism, for instance, asserts that the core substance of ‘American federalism’ is the 
protection of markets. . . . Adherents believe that ‘by harnessing competition among jurisdictions, 
federalism secures in the political arena the advantages of economic markets—consumer choice and 
satisfaction, innovation, superior products at lower prices.’”  Christian B. Sundquist, Positive Education 
Federalism: The Promise of Equality After The Every Student Succeeds Act, 68 MERCER L. REV. 351, 359 
(2017) (quoting MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 18-
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While the fact that our immigration system has become a quagmire is 
primarily a political failure, it could also be characterized as a market 
failure.  The very existence of millions of undocumented immigrants in 
the United States, and of millions of potential immigrants on waiting lists 
hoping to immigrate legally,115 suggests problems with the supply and 
demand of accessible visas.  In other words, the current system is 
suffering from an economically inefficient design.  
Economic inefficiency has been cited as major argument in favor of a 
completely open-borders policy, at least in the employment context:  
The [visa] backlog exists because more people apply for visas every year 
than there are visas available.  If there were no quota and visas were issued 
according to market demand, then there would be no delay other than 
processing.  There would be little issue accommodating the future flow of 
immigrants because such a system would not attempt to manage it.  Visas 
would simply be issued as qualifying people apply.116 
However, an open borders policy is dead-on-arrival, politically 
speaking.117  Moreover, there are important reasons to be skeptical of 
open borders.  If the immigration system’s sole purpose was to serve 
 
25, 3 (1999)).  
 115. The Pew Research Center estimates there were 11 million undocumented immigrants in the 
United States in 2015, while the Department of Homeland Security estimates that the figure is closer to 
12 million.  Compare Jeffrey S. Passel, Measuring Illegal Immigration: How Pew Research Center 
Counts Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S., PEW RES. CENTER (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/12/how-pew-research-center-counts-unauthorized-
immigrants-in-us/, with BRYAN BAKER, OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., POPULATION ESTIMATES (Dec. 2018).  
Meanwhile, approximately 1.1 million immigrants become LPRs each year and about 4.7 million 
applicants are currentlyon waiting lists. See RYAN BAUGH, OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: 
U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS (Oct. 2019); see also Bier, supra note 39.  
 116. Zachary J. Carls, Comment, American Immigration: A Path of Return to a Pre-Modern Ideal 
of Open Immigration Policy, 7 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 187, 218-19 (2019).  See also Alan O. Sykes, 
The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy 2 
(COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR L. & ECON., WORKING PAPER NO. 10,1992), available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/486e/14c83f773bdb8372236713a94ba532c7f959.pdf (“The curtailment 
of the temporary workers program in the United States may have much to do with the growth of illegal 
immigration.  It is difficult to fashion a persuasive economic argument against an open door policy toward 
temporary workers with employer sponsorship, and thus illegal immigration may be in large part the result 
of economically unsound U.S. policies. . . .  Absent an appropriate policy regarding the admission of  
temporary workers, illegal immigration may be a ‘second best’ response to the resulting economic 
inefficiencies.”); see also Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. 33 (Apr. 2007), 
https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2007/04/ImmigrationCSR26.pdf?_ga=2.262811212.198702938
8.1577413232-1782123223.1576985770 (“Keeping the number of visas fixed over time, as is the case 
now, means that during boom times U.S. employers have a stronger incentive to seek out illegal labor.”). 
 117. Danielle Kurtzleben, What the Latest Immigration Polls Do (And Don’t) Say, NPR (Jan. 23, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/580037717/what-the-latest-immigration-polls-do-and-dont-say 
(“Given the choice between ‘open borders’— a position that no mainstream political leaders are proposing 
— and a ‘secure border,’ which is current U.S. policy, 79 percent of Americans agreed that the U.S. needs 
‘secure borders.’”).  
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economic ends, then perhaps an open border would be appropriate.  But 
Americans are likely willing to sacrifice some economic efficiency in 
exchange for other perceived benefits, such as artificially inflating the 
wages of American workers, or for more abstract principles, such as a 
belief that limited immigration allows for greater assimilation.118  After 
all, in a democracy, it is the people’s prerogative to put other policy 
priorities above the supposed benefits of a completely unbridled, 
uncontrolled free market.   
Allowing states to craft their own visa programs, and to buy and sell 
visas from one another, would introduce a measurable supply and demand 
tool into the immigration system, creating at least some greater economic 
efficiency, without completely eliminating room for American voters to 
rank other values above the kind of efficient labor market that would 
arguably emerge from an open-border reform.  In this way, the proposal 
is somewhat analogous to cap-and-trade proposals to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions:  
Cap-and-trade . . . is designed to correct a market failure.  In the absence 
of the regulation of emissions, emitters do not pay the full social cost of 
their activities; those costs are instead borne by those harmed by climate 
change.  By capping emissions at a level thought necessary to reduce the 
effects of climate change and then distributing allowances to allow 
emissions up to the amount of the cap, allowance prices should reflect the 
marginal cost of abatement and emitters should find the means to reduce 
emissions that fall below that cost.119 
This Article’s proposal similarly strives to solve a market failure in the 
current immigration system.120  Of course, a cap-and-trade system is 
distinct in that it accepts as an essential precept that greenhouse gases are 
bad and should be reduced. In the immigration context, by contrast, 
Americans are sharply divided over whether immigration should be 
reduced or increased.121  But even setting aside this dispute over goals, 
cap-and-trade still provides important lessons for how this Article’s 
 
 118. For articles criticizing the concept of assimilation, see, e.g., Peter Skerry, Do We Really Want 
Immigrants to Assimilate?, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/do-we-
really-want-immigrants-to-assimilate/; Tom Gjelten, Should Immigration Require Assimilation?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/should-immigration-
require-assimilation/406759/; Glenn Llopis, Yet Another Call for Assimilation in America, but 
Assimilation to What?, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/glennllopis/2019/01/29/yet-another-call-for-assimilation-in-america-but-
assimilation-to-what/#16fc84283e07.  
 119. Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-And-Trade and Complementary 
Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 214 (2012).  
 120. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
 121. Jones, supra note 1.  For an explanation of why this proposal is likely to lead to an increase in 
the total number of lawful immigrants, see infra Part IV(B)(1).  
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proposal would work.  The cap-and-trade system recognizes that, even if 
most people generally agree that pollution should be reduced in the 
abstract, they do not want it reduced in exactly the same way in every 
industry or every community because the benefits of decreasing pollution 
are outweighed in some situations by the costs of shutting down entire 
factories or eliminating entire businesses. Cap-and-trade seeks to solve 
that problem by quantifying, through market mechanisms, the costs and 
benefits of allowing or limiting pollution in any given situation, rather 
than focusing only on across-the-board decreases.   
Similarly, people disagree as to whether immigration is a net cost or a 
net benefit.  Regardless of whether they are correct, the current system 
provides no real outlet for expressing those beliefs through effective 
policymaking.  For example, many conservatives bemoan the costs and 
dangers of immigration.122  But there has rarely been an opportunity for 
conservatives to, for lack of a better phrase, put their money where their 
mouth is and embrace the sort of stark, restrictionist policies they 
endorse.123  And there is at least some reason to believe that, if put to the 
test, Republican-led states would be more pro-immigrant than their 
rhetoric sometimes suggests.  In 2015, thirty Republican governors and 
one Democratic governor issued symbolic, but powerless, statements 
opposing the resettlement of Syrian refugees in their states.124  On 
 
 122. See, e.g., Matt O’Brien & Spencer Raley, The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United 
States Taxpayers, FAIR (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/fiscal-
burden-illegal-immigration-united-states-taxpayers; David Simcox, John L. Martin, & Rosemary Jenks, 
The Costs of Immigration, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 1, 1994), https://cis.org/Report/Costs-
Immigration; Kristin Tate, Your Taxpayer Dollars are Footing the Spiraling Costs of Illegal Immigration, 
THE HILL (Apr. 21, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/439930-your-taxpayer-dollars-are-
footing-the-spiraling-costs-of-illegal-immigration.  
For a few responses to the claim that immigration is a burden, see Alex Nowrasteh, FAIR’s”Fiscal Burden 
of Illegal Immigration” Study is Fatally Flawed, CATO INST. (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/fairs-fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-study-fatally-flawed; Miriam 
Valverde, Do Immigrants Cost U.S. Taxpayers $300 Billion Annually?, POLITIFACT (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/jan/23/donald-trump/does-immigration-
policy-impose-300-billion-annuall/. 
 123. Even President Trump’s anti-immigrant policies—however painful for individuals who have 
borne the brunt of his actions—have had only modest impacts on the immigration system as whole.  The 
total number of deportations under President Trump were actually lower than under President Obama, his 
efforts to build a border wall were mostly stymied by Congress and the courts, and his policies on refugees 
and asylees—the area where he had the most unilateral discretion—affected only a small subset of the 
total number of immigrants in the United States.  See Zack Budryk, Deportations Lower Under Trump 
Administration Than Obama: Report, THE HILL (Nov. 18, 2019), https://thehill.com/latino/470900-
deportations-lower-under-trump-than-obama-report); Miriam Valverde, Donald Trump’s Border Wall: 
How Much Has Been Built?, POLITIFACT (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2019/aug/30/donald-trumps-border-wall-how-much-has-really-been/; see also text 
accompanying supra note 32.  
 124. Ashley Fantz & Ben Brumfield, More than Half the Nation’s Governors Say Syrian Refugees 
Not Welcome, CNN (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/world/paris-attacks-syrian-
refugees-backlash/index.html. 
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September 26, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order that 
would have, for the first time, allowed states to block refugee 
resettlement.125  But over the next four months, almost all states declined 
to do so.126  In other words, while some politicians may have taken 
rhetorical positions against refugees, few have been willing to actually 
risk the political or economic consequences of excluding them entirely 
when given the opportunity to do so.127 
On the other hand, most liberals—though, as with conservatives, not 
all—claim that immigration is beneficial, and have expressed a desire to 
undertake greater state and local action to demonstrate that support.128  As 
with conservatives, there is at least some reason to believe liberal policies 
may not match liberal rhetoric.  It is worth noting, for example, that one 
of the bulwarks of the Democratic Party in the United States—the labor 
union movement—has been historically opposed to increased 
immigration levels, and in some instances has even stymied 
comprehensive immigration reform efforts.129  In any event, like 
 
 125. Exec. Order No. 13,888, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (Sept. 26, 2019). 
 126. As of January 14, 2020, 42 governors, including 19 Republicans, had confirmed that they 
intended to resettle refugees for the next year. Texas was the only state to announce it would reject 
refugees. Nomaan Merchant, Texas Governor to Reject New Refugees, First Under Trump, AP (Jan. 14, 
2020), https://apnews.com/7329dbc3dcbf32534689831455fa4246.  The remaining seven governors 
would have had until January 21, 2020, to decide whether to accept refugees, but on January 15, 2020, a 
court enjoined enforcement of the executive order, mooting the issue.  See HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, Civil No. 
PJM 19-3346, 2020 WL 218646 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2020).  As of November 2020, that injunction remains 
in effect pending an ongoing appeal. See HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, Appeal No. 20-1160 (4th Cir.) (docket last 
reviewed Nov. 10, 2020).  
 127. See, e.g., Julie Watson & David Sharp, Trump Lets States, Cities Refuse Refugees for 1st Rime 
in U.S., PBS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trump-lets-states-cities-refuse-
refugees-for-1st-time-in-u-s (discussing the economic benefits of refugees in North Dakota); Paighten 
Harkins, Gov. Gary Herbert Wants More Refugees to Resettle in Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/11/01/utah-governor-asks-trump/ (discussing a letter from the 
Republican governor of Utah to the Trump Administration asking that additional refugees be settled in 
Utah); John Hudak, Elaine Kamarck, & Christine Stenglein, Trump Threatened Sanctuary Cities, and 
They Shrugged—Here’s Why, BROOKINGS INST. (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/05/01/trump-threatened-sanctuary-cities-and-they-
shrugged-heres-why/ (concluding that asylees “contributed $63 billion more in government revenues than 
they cost.”). 
 128. For example, in mid-2019, President Trump stated, apparently as a threat, that he would begin 
releasing detained undocumented immigrants into communities that identified as sanctuary cities. 
Democratic mayors from Chicago, Seattle, and Philadelphia, among other places, all responded by saying 
that they would welcome these immigrants into their communities. See Graham Vyse, Sanctuary City 
Mayors Respond to Trump’s Threat ‘With Open Arms,’ GOVERNING (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-mayors-sanctuary-cities-trump.html. 
 129. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 553-58 (2007) 
(discussing the history of anti-immigrant sentiment among unions and recent moves away from those 
positions); Julia Preston & Steven Greenhouse, Immigration Accord by Labor Boosts Obama Effort, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/us/14immig.html (discussing divisions 
among organized labor regarding the proposed 2007 comprehensive immigration reform efforts, and 
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conservatives, liberals are also mostly limited in their ability to act on 
their stated support for increased immigration under the current system.130 
 Introducing a market for visas would put conservative and liberal 
beliefs about immigration to the test because states would more directly 
bear the costs of their decisions.  States that view immigration either as a 
moral good or an economic boon could purchase visas from other states 
in order to direct more immigration to their communities.  States opposed 
to immigration could essentially put a price on their anti-immigrant 
beliefs, preferring the certainty of cash to the more abstract (though likely 
more sizeable) economic and cultural benefits of increased 
immigration.131 
In reality, under this Article’s proposal, no state is particularly likely to 
engage in absolutist immigration policymaking.  It would be financially 
impossible for a pro-immigrant state to buy every visa from every other 
state. At some point, other states would stop selling their visas, no matter 
the price offered, because those states also want to see the benefits of 
immigration.  By the same token, even the least immigrant-friendly state 
government would be unlikely to support a complete stop to immigration 
to their state once they realize the economic consequences of such a 
decision.  
Most importantly, regardless of how absolutist any particular state 
becomes in their immigration policies, as is true with free market systems 
generally, the expectation is that supply and demand would allocate 
immigrants more equitably throughout the country over time, in 
proportion to the value—economic, moral, civic, or otherwise—that each 
community places on immigration.132 
IV. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS 
Of course, significant pushback would be expected for such a large-
scale change to the U.S. immigration system.  This final Part addresses 
some of the most likely criticisms.  
 
noting that while unions had agreed to support some reforms in 2009, they continued to oppose any 
expansion of guestworker programs).   
 130. See, e.g., Clint Hendler, The ‘Sanctuary City’ Scam, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 6, 
2007), https://archives.cjr.org/campaign_desk/the_sanctuary_city_scam.php (discussing how sanctuary 
cities, one of the more common liberal reactions to the Trump Administration’s anti-immigrant policies, 
are typically more symbolic than substantive).  
 131. See Nowrasteh, supra note 122; Valverde, supra note 122; Gretchen Frazee, 4 Myths About 
How Immigrants Affect the U.S. Economy, PBS (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4-myths-about-how-immigrants-affect-the-u-s-
economy.  
 132. See supra note 84.  For a discussion of whether this Article’s proposal would ultimately lead 
to increased immigrant segregation, see infra Part IV(B)(2). 
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A. Constitutionality of the Proposal 
 Perhaps the most important question facing this proposal is whether 
devolving immigration powers to the states is even constitutional.  After 
all, for most of the last century, it has been widely accepted that the federal 
government has unlimited and exclusive power over immigration 
policy.133 
Scholars have undertaken important work to challenge this premise.  It 
has become increasingly clear that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, states set their own immigration policies.134  But whatever the 
merits of recognizing this history, it has had little bearing on judicial 
interpretations of the federal immigration power in the modern era.  As 
recently as 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated that the federal 
government “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of 
immigration” and that the “federal power to determine immigration 
policy is well settled.”135  
This plenary federal power is often seen as the primary barrier to state 
involvement in immigration policy,136 and this power raises at least three 
constitutional questions regarding devolution.  First, is such a delegation 
even possible, given the federal government’s inherent sovereign powers 
and the Constitution’s Naturalization clause?  Second, even if it may be 
devolved, how much discretion could states exercise over immigrant 
admissions in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  Finally, would the delegation of powers to the states violate 
the anti-commandeering doctrine?  
 
 133. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
 134. Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1566-78; see also Ryan Terrence Chin, Comment, Moving Toward 
Subfederal Involvement in Federal Immigration Law: Defining the Outsider, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 
1881-89 (2011) (explaining that before 1875, states, rather than the federal government, were primarily 
responsible for enacting immigration statutes).  
 135. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2012); but see id. at 419 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n the first 100 years of the Republic, the States enacted numerous laws 
restricting the immigration of certain classes of aliens, including convicted criminals, indigents, persons 
with contagious diseases, and (in Southern States) freed blacks.”). 
 136. For example, several groups filed a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s executive order 
permitting states to bar refugee resettlement in their jurisdiction.  Among other things, the plaintiffs 
asserted that “[t]he Executive Order and Defendants’ implementation of it seek to delegate to state and 
local governments authority that the Constitution vested exclusively with the federal government.”  See 
Complaint, ¶¶ 144-145, Hias, Inc. v. Donald Trump, Case No. 8:19-cv-3346 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2019). On 
January 15, 2020, Judge Peter Messitte granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding 
that they would most likely prevail in showing that the executive order violated existing law. HIAS, Inc. 
v. Trump, Civil No. PJM 19-3346, 2020 WL 218646 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2020).  But notably, with respect 
to the constitutional issues presented, Judge Messitte’s findings were limited to the issue of federal 
preemption, which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s framing of the issue in Arizona v. United 
States., 567 U.S. at399.  See infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.  He did not suggest that the 
Constitution inherently prohibited this type of delegation. Id. 
36
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss4/4
946 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
 1. Federal Supremacy: Can Congress Devolve Its Immigration 
Powers?  
In 2001, Professor Michael Wishnie asserted that “the immigration 
power is an exclusively federal one that Congress may not devolve by 
statute to the states.”137  Professor Wishnie argued that this conclusion 
was rooted in three constitutional provisions and one extra-constitutional 
concept: (1) the Naturalization Clause, which states that “[t]he Congress 
shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”;138 
(2) the Foreign Affairs Clauses, which vest the federal government with 
the power to negotiate treaties and go to war;139 (3) the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, which gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations”;140 and (4) the more abstract concept of national 
sovereignty.141  Professor Wishnie argued that any devolution of 
immigration power to the states would necessarily violate the uniformity 
requirement of the Naturalization Clause, would set the states on collision 
courses with foreign nations that disagreed with individual states’ 
immigration policies, and would dilute the sovereignty of the federal 
government.142  
But these concerns are generally overstated. The United States has a 
long history of states enacting immigration provisions, which has posed 
no apparent threat to foreign policy or federal sovereignty.143 And 
Professor Peter J. Spiro has argued that, in today’s world, states already 
exercise significant foreign policy powers: 
Like it or not, state governments have become increasingly active on the 
international stage. . . .  State officials now have routine dealings with 
foreign governments (both national and subnational) on cultural and 
economic matters, and almost all have established trade and tourism offices 
in various locations abroad.  Dozens of state and local governments have 
 
 137. See Wishnie, supra note 10, at 497.  
 138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations. . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“To declare 
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water. . . 
.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors”). 
 140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 141. See Wishnie, supra note 10, at 532 n.209 (citing, among other sources, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), which held that “the investment of the federal government 
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. 
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations 
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the 
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”). 
         142.  Wishnie, supra note 10 at 533-35, 548-52. 
 143. See Stumpf, supra note 9; Chin, supra note 134. 
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in recent years taken formal action, evidently motivated by traditional 
foreign policy concerns.  These developments appear irreversible, at least 
in the short run.  The federal government can no longer perform the 
function of the gatekeeper between domestic and international realms as 
breaches in the wall between the two inescapably widen.  The notion that 
the federal government now has or will any time soon restore a monopoly 
over U.S. foreign relations is a fiction[.]144 
 Importantly, nothing about the Supreme Court’s handling of 
immigration cases suggests it would agree with Professor Wishnie’s 
position.  In Arizona v. United States, one of the Supreme Court’s most 
important immigration decisions in decades, the majority held that certain 
Arizona immigration laws were preempted by federal law.145  Although 
the court struck down Arizona’s laws, it did so based on their apparent 
conflict with federal laws enacted by Congress, rather than by invoking 
more general Constitutional limitations.146 
In Arizona v. United States, the Court began by recounting familiar 
preemption principles: (1) that “Congress may withdraw specified powers 
from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption 
provision”; (2) that state law may be displaced by “a framework of 
regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws 
on the same subject’”; and (3) that state laws “are preempted when they 
conflict with federal law.”147  None of these principles would prevent 
Congress from delegating immigrant admission decisions to the states.  If 
Congress did so, it would not be expressly preempting state conduct and 
it would not be regulating an area so pervasively as to prevent state 
conduct.  It would, in fact, be doing the exact opposite by allowing states 
to regulate in that field.  And although immigration policy generally 
appears to be a “federal interest so dominant” that preemption might 
otherwise be “assumed,” it would be much harder for a court to make that 
assumption if Congress affirmatively passed legislation to delegate some 
of its immigration powers.  Finally, as with all interactions between the 
federal government and the states, it would be up to the states to pass laws 
that fell within the parameters permitted by the federal government; any 
law beyond that would be subject to normal federal preemption analysis. 
Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence in Arizona goes even further, 
arguing at length that states have a sovereign right to be involved in 
 
 144. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 121, 161-62 (1994). 
 145. Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012). 
        146.  Id. at 398-400. 
 147. Id. at 399. 
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immigration decisions.  Justice Scalia acknowledged that “state 
regulation is excluded by the Constitution when (1) it has been prohibited 
by a valid federal law, or (2) it conflicts with federal regulation—when, 
for example, it admits those whom federal regulation would exclude, or 
excludes those whom federal regulation would admit.”148  But it follows, 
under this logic, that if the federal government delegated to the states the 
power to make admission decisions, states exercising that power would 
not be “admit[ting] those whom federal regulation would exclude.”  
Relatedly, Justice Thomas has noted that the most straightforward 
reading of the Naturalization Clause is that it allows, but does not 
mandate, Congress to create a uniform rule of naturalization.  In other 
words, Congress is free to depart from the rule of uniformity and allow 
the states to create variable naturalization schemes:  
Even after the Constitution gave Congress the power to “establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States,” Art. I, § 
8, cl. 4, Congress was under no obligation to do so, and the Framers surely 
expected state law to continue in full force unless and until Congress acted. 
. . .  
 
Even when Congress enacted the first federal naturalization law in 1790, it 
left open the possibility that the individual States could establish more 
lenient standards of their own for admitting people to citizenship.  While 
Hamilton had suggested that Congress’ power to “establish an Uniform 
Rule” logically precluded the States from deviating downward from the 
rule that Congress established, see The Federalist No. 32, at 199, the early 
cases on this question took the opposite view.  See Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. 
294, 296, 1 L.Ed. 387 (CC Pa. 1792) (Wilson, Blair, and Peters, JJ.). States 
therefore continued to enact naturalization laws of their own until 1795, 
when Congress passed an exclusive naturalization law.  See J. Kettner, 
Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, pp. 242-243 (1978).149 
 In sum, the relevant case law supports the conclusion that immigrant 
admission powers could be constitutionally delegated to the states.  
2. The Equal Protection Clause: How Much Discretion Would States 
Have to Exercise Immigration Powers?  
In many ways, the more difficult question concerns the level of 
discretion states would have in crafting their visa programs, assuming 
Congress decided to delegate immigrant admission powers to them.  
There has been a sharp divide between state courts and federal courts on 
 
 148. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 149. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 872, 872 n.13 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
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this question, and for this Article’s proposal to work, it would almost 
certainly be necessary for the Supreme Court to ultimately come down on 
the side of the federal courts.  
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that the federal government was 
permitted to discriminate against different classes of aliens (for example, 
based on their length of residency in the United States) so long as the 
discriminatory law could survive rational basis review; by contrast, states 
could discriminate on the basis of alienage only if their discriminatory 
laws were able to survive strict scrutiny.150  This different treatment arose 
from the fact that, when reviewing federal laws, the Supreme Court had 
to balance the intrinsic federal power over immigration against the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, while only the Equal 
Protection Clause was relevant when it reviewed state laws.151   
But what if the states were authorized to engage in such discrimination 
by the federal government?  In Graham v. Richardson, which first 
subjected state policies to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court explicitly 
warned in dicta that, because of the Naturalization Clause, “[a] 
congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to 
adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for 
federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this 
explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”152  However, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Mathews v. Diaz153 complicated 
things by concluding that federal immigration laws would only be subject 
to rational basis review.  At least one scholar (and several courts) have 
concluded that, under Mathews, if “the states are carrying out an explicit 
congressional policy,” then “the resulting classifications should be seen 
as incidents of federal policy, not state policy, and should thus receive 
rational basis review.”154 
The Supreme Court has never resolved the tension between Graham 
and Mathews.  Nevertheless, the issue was litigated in state courts and the 
federal circuit courts following the enactment of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”) 
in 1996.   
 
 150. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 
(1976).  
 151. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85. 
 152. Graham, 402 U.S. at 382. 
 153. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-86.  
 154. Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247, 2253 (2005); see also 
id. at 2267 (“If the immigration power is rooted in the nation’s inherent sovereign powers, the case for a 
congressional power to delegate is even stronger. Congress should be able, in the exercise of inherent 
sovereign powers, to authorize states to classify on the basis of alienage in whatever manner they 
choose.”). See also Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) and Korab v. Fink, 797 
F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2014). 
40
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss4/4
950 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
Among other things, PRWORA authorized states to limit the classes of 
immigrants that could receive benefits from certain federal welfare 
programs.155  Many states responded by imposing limitations on the 
availability of welfare for immigrants.  State courts in New York, 
Arizona, and Massachusetts struck down these limitations.156  Each of the 
courts held that, notwithstanding Congress’s delegation of power to the 
states in PRWORA, Graham was still the appropriate rule.  In other 
words, each state’s laws permitting some, but not all, immigrants to 
receive welfare benefits were subject to strict scrutiny, and in each case, 
the laws were struck down on the ground that the states were 
unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of alienage.  
If the rule from these three state courts was applied to this Article’s 
proposal, states would be significantly inhibited from creating their own 
visa regimes.  At least hypothetically, an immigrant already legally living 
in the United States under a temporary visa—and who is therefore 
covered by the Equal Protection Clause157—could argue that any policy 
granting a permanent visa to a new immigrant from abroad, rather than to 
the immigrant already present, would have to be defended under strict 
scrutiny.  True, states might be able to satisfy that burden in some 
exceptional cases. A state could show, for example, that it had a 
compelling interest in admitting a refugee from a life-threatening danger, 
and that the least restrictive means of accomplishing that goal was to grant 
the refugee a permanent visa, even though that meant no permanent visa 
was available for a student or a guestworker on a temporary visa already 
living in the United States.  However, the need to justify each policy under 
strict scrutiny would still dramatically limit states’ abilities to experiment 
with programs unique to their respective needs.  Suddenly, courts would 
be called on to second-guess every visa issued, and the benefits of the 
program—democratic accountability, innovation, market efficiency—
would mostly vanish.  
Luckily, this is not the only, or even the most likely, possible outcome.  
Federal courts have also addressed PRWORA and have explicitly 
disagreed with these state court cases, concluding instead that state laws 
enacted under PRWORA were only subject to rational basis review.  In 
Soskin v. Reinertson, the Tenth Circuit concluded that PRWORA 
reflected a “national policy that Congress has the constitutional power to 
enact” and that “a state’s exercise of discretion [under PRWORA] can 
 
 155. See Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613. 
 156. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001), Kurti v. Maricopa Cnty., 33 P.3d 499 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2001), and Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Authority, 959 N.E.2d 970 (Mass. 
2012). 
 157. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-13 (1982).  
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also effectuate national policy.”158  This meant that the rational basis 
deference generally afforded federal alienage laws extended to the states 
as well.159  The Ninth Circuit later endorsed the same reading in Korab v. 
Fink.160 
These cases are not, by themselves, a guarantee that rational basis 
review would be extended to the states if this proposal was adopted.  Most 
troublingly, the Tenth Circuit’s decision was based, at least in part, on the 
fact that PRWORA had “no direct relationship to the naturalization 
process” because it was limited to welfare benefit decisions.161  This 
Article’s proposal, by contrast, is much more closely related to 
naturalization: the permanent visas issued by the states would entitle 
recipients to LPR status and, ultimately, citizenship.   
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that courts evaluating this 
Article’s proposal would reach the same result as the Soskin and Korab 
courts.  Even under the existing immigration regime, states play a 
significant role in determining whether an immigrant obtains the benefits 
of naturalization.  For example, when marriage is relevant to determining 
admissibility, the United States looks to whether “the qualifying marriage 
was entered into in accordance with the laws of the place where the 
marriage took place.”162  Different marital requirements in different states 
(such as the existence of common law marriage) can therefore affect an 
individual’s eligibility for a permanent visa.  Additionally, certain 
juvenile immigrants may become LPRs if they have “been declared 
dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States . . . [and] 
reunification with [one] or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable 
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State 
law.”163  Yet the ability of juveniles to invoke this provision varies widely 
depending on their state of residence.164  Finally, courts have held that an 
individual can be deported for violating a criminal statute even if the same 
conduct is legal in a neighboring jurisdiction.165  In short, “while 
immigration law is often described as the archetypical uniform national 
 
 158. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 161. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256.  
 162. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(I).  
 163. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).  
 164. Compare In re S.A.R.D., 182 So.3d 897 (Fla. 2016) (interpreting the Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status laws narrowly) with Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 423 P.3d 334 (Cal. 2018) (interpreting 
the same laws expansively). State approaches to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status provisions vary 
widely; some state courts have gone so far as to refuse to participate in the process altogether. For a 
summary of the positions taken by various states, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Juarez v. Ky. Cabinet 
for Health & Family Servs. (2019) No. 19-638. 
 165. Petition of Lee Wee, 143 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Cal. 1956).  
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policy—the federal government often claims in court that its power to 
regulate migration comes from Congress’s authority to create a ‘uniform 
rule of naturalization’—immigration law in practice varies from state to 
state.”166 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized this dichotomy:  
In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 22 S.Ct. 857, 46 L.Ed. 
1113 (1902), the Court considered a challenge to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act 
on the ground that its incorporation of divergent state laws failed to 
“establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies” and 
unconstitutionally “delegate[d] certain legislative powers to the several 
states.”  Id. at 183, 22 S.Ct. 857.  The Court held that the incorporation of 
state laws “is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United 
States” because the “general operation of the law is uniform although it 
may result in certain particulars differently in different states.”  Id. at 190, 
22 S.Ct. 857. 
 
The principle that “uniformity does not require the elimination of any 
differences among the States” has equal traction here [in the immigration 
context].  Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469, 102 S.Ct. 
1169, 71 L.Ed.2d 335 (1982).  As in the bankruptcy context, although the 
“particulars” are different in different states, the basic operation of 
[PRWORA] is uniform throughout the United States.  Stellwagen v. Clum, 
245 U.S. 605, 613, 38 S.Ct. 215, 62 L.Ed. 507 (1918) (holding that 
bankruptcy law may be uniform and yet “may recognize the laws of the 
state in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to different 
results in different states”).167 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a national scheme by 
Congress to delegate immigrant admission powers to the states would be 
constitutional and would allow states to adopt visa regimes that (as 
expressions of federal policy) would be subject to rational basis review, 
the same standard applied to admission decisions made by the federal 
government itself.  This would allow states the maximum level of 
flexibility necessary to create visa regimes that meet the needs of each 
particular state.  
 
 166. Cox & Posner, supra note 54, at 1332 (footnote omitted); see also Leticia M. Saucedo, States 
of Desire: How Immigration Law Allows States to Attract Desired Immigrants, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
471, 473-74 (2018) (“[O]ver the past thirty years, Congress increasingly has devolved considerable 
authority to states over decisions that affect immigration regulation. . . .  Congress has granted power to 
the states to define and identify key terms of the immigration statute in areas where the states traditionally 
hold such powers (licensing, criminal law, and family regulation, for example).”). 
 167. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581-82 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 
429 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Constitution simply requires Congress to enact rules of naturalization that 
apply uniformly throughout the United States, even though those uniform federal rules may produce 
results that differ by state.”). 
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3. Impact of the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
 Although federal supremacy and equal protection are the greatest 
constitutional threats to this Article’s proposal, the anti-commandeering 
doctrine must also be briefly addressed. 
 The Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional for “federal 
legislation [to] commandeer[] a State’s legislative or administrative 
apparatus for federal purposes.”168  Davon Collins, in proposing a 
narrower delegation program in which states could issue temporary 
employment visas, expressed concern about whether state-based visas 
would run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine.169  He sought to 
obviate this issue by emphasizing that his program was voluntary: only 
states that wanted to participate would do so, and the federal government 
would not force any state to be involved.170  
This Article’s proposal is less voluntary than Mr. Collins’ proposal in 
that all states would automatically receive a distribution of visas.  But it 
is unlikely to raise any commandeering concerns because no state would 
actually be forced to issue visas or otherwise build up an immigrant 
admissions infrastructure.  A state could instead sell all of its visas, if it 
wanted, or it could simply let them go unused, leading to their expiration 
at the end of the year.  Accordingly, the federal government would not be 
forcing the states to engage in any immigration functions against their 
will.171 
Nor should state officials who become responsible for administering 
the system be seen as state officials doing federal work.  Again, creating 
an application system, vetting applicants, and forwarding requests to the 
State Department to issue travel permits, would all be undertaken by the 
states only if they chose to do so.  State officials involved in this work 
would no more be doing federal work than the county clerk or justice of 
the peace that performed a marriage between a U.S. citizen and a foreign 
national, or the police officer, district attorney, and state court judge who 
caused an immigrant to be found guilty of a crime, even though such 
conduct has direct consequences on an individual’s ability to obtain a 
 
 168. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012). 
 169. See Collins, supra note 12, at 369. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Somewhat analogously, in response to the Special Juvenile Immigrant Status program, which 
instructs state courts to make findings relevant to juvenile immigrant applications (see text accompanying 
supra note 162), some state courts have simply declined to make the requested findings, on the ground 
only the state legislatures, not Congress, can provide them with the jurisdiction to engage in such work.  
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 162; see also Canales v. Torres Orellana, 800 
S.E.2d 208, 217 (Va. Ct. App. 2017) (en banc); de Rubio v. Rubio Herrera, 541 S.W.3d 564 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2017); Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73 (Ky. 2019).   
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visa.172  
Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, this Article’s proposal 
would most likely pass constitutional muster.  
B. Political Impediments 
Of course, whether a given proposal is constitutional ultimately has 
very little to do with whether it is good policy.  This Subpart therefore 
addresses the three most difficult political questions likely to be raised by 
this Article’s proposal.  
1. Would the Proposal Increase or Decrease the Total Number of 
Legal Immigrants to the United States?  
In theory, this Article’s proposal is disconnected from the question of 
how many immigrants America should accept each year.  Congress could 
double the number of visas and then let states distribute them; or Congress 
could slash the number of visas in half and then let states distribute those 
visas.  Either way, devolution to the states would be valuable because of 
the increased opportunities for experimentation, greater democratic 
accountability for the policies created, and a distribution of immigrants 
throughout the country that better reflects the will of local political 
communities.  
That said, realistically, the politicians tasked with enacting this 
proposal are likely to be most interested in whether the proposal would 
lead to increased or decreased immigration. 
i. Possible Short-Term Decreases 
If this Article’s proposal were enacted, it is at least plausible that, in 
the short-term, the total number of immigrants coming to the United 
States would decrease.  
First, there currently is no cap on the number of visas available for 
several categories, including immediate family members, temporary 
farmworkers, and students. Instead, the number of visas for those 
categories is capped only by the number of individuals who qualify.173  In 
 
 172. Similarly, Julia Jagow has argued that giving states additional power to regulate guestworker 
visas would be no different than delegating to states oversight over Medicaid and certain Clean Air Act 
emissions standards. See Jagow, supra note 12. But for a contrasting view, see States’ Commandeered 
Convictions, supra note 9 (contending that using state convictions as a basis for deportation violates anti-
commandeering principles).  
 173. That is not to say these categories are totally disconnected from the cap system. Often, the 
number of visas issued for one category can lead to a decrease in the number of visas issued in a different 
category. See KANDEL, supra note 23. 
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order to transition to a system where states are in charge of issuing visas, 
and where states can adjust the types and qualifications of each visa, such 
open-ended categories would need to be eliminated.  Instead, there would 
need to be a specific, total number of permanent visas and a specific, total 
number of months for temporary visas available each year across all 
categories.  
In establishing this total number, Congress could theoretically take the 
opportunity to increase the levels of legal immigration, as has repeatedly 
been proposed.174  For example, the number of permanent visas could be 
set at 1,266,129, which is the largest number of permanent visas issued in 
any one year in the last two decades.175  However, it would likely be more 
politically palatable to set the number at about 1,050,000, which is close 
to the average number of visas issued over the last twenty years.176  
Adopting an average would mean that it is less than the number admitted 
in certain years, leading to a short-term decrease in the number of legal 
immigrants.  On the other hand, the use of an average also means that the 
number of admitted immigrants is higher than the number admitted in 
other years; and over the long-term, the total number of immigrants 
admitted would be the same as if no cap had been introduced. 
Second, there is a risk that certain states would simply refuse to issue 
the visas allocated to them, leading to a net decrease in the number of 
immigrants entering the United States each year, even if the number of 
available visas was the same. 
While this possibility cannot be completely dismissed, it should be 
viewed skeptically.  As an initial matter, states that are opposed to 
increased levels of immigration would be able to profit by selling their 
visas to other states.  Given this incentive, it seems far more likely that 
states would sell visas, allowing them to be used elsewhere, rather than 
simply sit on visas and let them expire out of a pique of anti-immigrant 
sentiment.  Moreover, even if there were states that occasionally insisted 
on neither issuing nor selling their share of the visas, a good reallocation 
system would prevent any one state from having an outsized impact for 
more than a few years.  As noted above, this Article does not take a 
position on how the visas should be allocated each year—by total 
population, by economic size, by history of immigration, or by some other 
metric.  However, under almost any system, states that consistently refuse 
to issue or sell their visas would eventually receive a smaller and smaller 
share of visas to distribute at the outset of each new year.177  The result is 
 
 174. See supra note 35. 
 175. See YEARBOOK, supra note 24. 
 176. Id. Similarly, the number of months available for temporary visas would ideally be calculated 
based on the number of temporary visas issued over the last few years.  
 177. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. A system that allocates exactly the same 
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that no one state, by itself, would have the power to create a long-term 
decrease in immigration levels.  
Finally, it is worth reiterating that anti-immigration sentiment at the 
state level might still be preferable to anti-immigration sentiment at the 
federal level.  Setting caps on all visas may seem to bode ill for 
immigration rates, but there would also be some political benefits to that 
decision.  For example, since the decision to admit refugees would be 
made by the states, this Article’s proposal would prevent an anti-
immigration president from unilaterally and dramatically reducing the 
annual number of refugees admitted, since that decision would instead by 
made by the states.178  And members of Congress would feel less pressure 
from anti-immigrant constituents to limit immigration nationally if those 
same constituents were able to limit immigration at the state level:  
By allowing the states individually to let off their steam, however scalding 
it may be, the nation need not visit the same sins. . . .  It is plausible that 
greater state-level discretion could help build a more durable foundation 
for a more consistently benign federal posture toward aliens, their 
admission, and their legal status relative to the citizenry.179  
Thus, at least arguably, the risks of certain states seeking to reduce the 
total number of immigrants may still be preferable to the current system.  
 ii. Likely Long-Term Increases 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is likely this Article’s proposal would 
lead to a long-term increase in the total number of legal visas authorized 
each year.  By creating a market-based distribution system for visas, states 
that desire increased immigration will be able to get it by purchasing visas 
from states that do not want a growing immigrant population.  If some 
states want more visas, even after having exhausted their ability to 
purchase visas from other states—a likely assumption, given the current 
demand for immigration180—it would be politically easier for their 
senators and representatives to convince their more recalcitrant 
colleagues to oblige them.  Senators and representatives from states that 
are opposed to increased immigration could justify supporting an increase 
in the number of visas by reassuring their constituents—or themselves—
 
number of visas to each state, regardless of size or other factors, is the one exception. Under that system, 
a state that refused to either issue or sell its visas could independently cause an overall decrease in 
immigration rates to the United States. But as discussed above, see supra note 84, such a system would 
be an exceedingly inefficient allocation, and so should be avoided even apart from the possible 
ramifications such a distribution would have on net immigration levels.  
 178. See Allyn, supra note 31. 
 179. Spiro, supra note 143, at 173-74.  
 180. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
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that their state would have a direct financial interest in allowing for more 
visas (because their share of the visas could be sold), without actually 
risking any influx of new immigrants to their own state.181 
Accordingly, although there may be legitimate concerns that setting a 
total cap on the number of visas and allowing states a say in immigrant-
admission decisions would lead to a decrease in the number of immigrants 
to the United States, in the long-term, this proposal could provide the 
political environment necessary for Congress to increase the number of 
visas available annually.  
iii. Fluctuations Due to Increased Bureaucracy 
The above concerns are focused on government conduct: how high a 
cap Congress will set and how aggressively states will pursue pro-
immigrant or anti-immigrant policies.  A separate question relates to 
immigrants themselves.  Those in favor of increased immigration could 
be reasonably concerned that a new, fifty-state visa system would impose 
such an increase of bureaucratic burdens that would-be immigrants could 
become discouraged from applying at all.  Immigrants with family 
members in multiple states or job offers in different markets could be 
forced to do more paperwork to apply for a visa in each of those states, 
rather than through the unified federal system that exists presently.  And 
to the extent that one state’s system is vastly different from other states, 
the added confusion could be foreboding.  
This is a legitimate concern, but its effect would most likely be 
marginal.  After all, immigrants already navigate complex, competing 
systems to obtain visas.  Prospective students, for example, must apply to 
numerous universities before ever beginning the immigration process.182  
Yet every year, hundreds of thousands of immigrants successfully make 
it through this process.  And of course, the same is true in the employment 
context. As with applying for school, it can be confusing and exhausting 
 
 181. Economic data shows that even though LPRs may theoretically move anywhere in the United 
States, they rarely do so. In 2018, only 2.3% of noncitizen immigrants moved from one state to another. 
The statistics for immigrants that have become U.S. citizens were even lower: just 1.5% moved from one 
state to another. By contrast, about 2.4% of native-born citizens moved from one state to another in 2018. 
A spreadsheet summarizing this data is in the possession of the author and may be reviewed upon request.  
For the raw data, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE B07007: GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY IN THE PAST 
YEAR BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS FOR CURRENT RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), available at 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=b07007&g=0100000US&tid=ACSDT1Y2019.B07007&hidePrev
iew=true. 
 182. See Chester & Cully, supra note 20, at 395 (“To begin the process of obtaining an F-1 
Nonimmigrant Student Visa, the student must first apply to a USCIS-approved U.S. academic institution. 
Upon acceptance, there is a long checklist that the alien student must complete which includes, inter alia, 
obtaining a Certificate of Eligibility from the school, payment of fees, completion of the visa application 
itself, and assembling important documents such as birth certificate, transcripts, and passport.”). 
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to apply to numerous companies before finally obtaining a job, yet this is 
a necessary prerequisite to obtaining an employment visa.183  
In short, concerns about increased bureaucracy are understandable but 
not so serious as to doom this proposal.  Delegating powers to the states 
might create an added burden for immigrants who must navigate multiple 
states’ application and approval processes.  But these added costs are, on 
the whole, likely to be relatively minor.  The federal government already 
delegates significant aspects of the immigration system to employers, 
sponsoring family members, schools, religious institutions, refugee 
resettlement agencies, and even the states.184  Despite these hurdles, 
immigrants have successfully managed this balkanized system in the past.  
The creation of state-based visas is unlikely to significantly exacerbate 
the already existing problems of bureaucracy, and therefore is unlikely to 
lead to any decrease in the total number of foreign nationals seeking to 
enter the United States each year.  
2. Would the Proposal Increase or Decrease Immigrant Segregation?  
Under this proposal, pro-immigrant states would be likely to purchase 
an increasing share of visas, and once immigrants arrive in a particular 
state, they are likely to stay there.185  Accordingly, this proposal has the 
potential to increase the immigrant populations of certain pro-immigrant 
states while other states stagnate, leading to increasingly segregated 
immigrant communities.  
This risk of increased segregation has been identified as one of the key 
reasons not to allow state involvement in immigration decisions.  As one 
commentator has noted:  
[A]llowing states to engage in experiments that either welcome or repel 
immigrants threatens to undermine national cohesion in a number of ways. 
. . .  [S]tate immigration laws generate three separate divisions that fall 
along racial and ethnic lines: (1) profiling and selective enforcement; (2) 
the actual movement of immigrants, most of whom are Latino, away from 
restrictionist states; and (3) public attitudes about these trends. These 
developments threaten to shake loose the nation’s basic conception of a 
shared identity.186  
 
 183. While the immigrant is responsible for finding a job, once a position is secured, it is the 
prospective employer, not the immigrant, who takes the lead in working through the visa application 
system. Id. at 391 (“Forms detailing the position and salary, as well as information regarding salaries of 
U.S. employees in similar positions, and any necessary fees are submitted to USCIS by the employer, not 
by the potential employee.”). 
 184. Cox & Posner, supra note 54. 
 185. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 179.  
 186. See Cunningham-Parmeter supra note 10, at 1720-21; see also Wishnie, supra note 10 
(warning that devolution will necessarily lead to increased anti-immigrant discrimination); Burch Elias, 
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But there are reasons to be skeptical of this conclusion.  First, 
immigrants are already segregated: most immigrants have sorted 
themselves into just a few corners of the country.187  This proposal may 
bring some light to this already-existing structure, as some states seek an 
increasing share of the visas and others sell their visas off, but it is 
unlikely to dramatically exacerbate the problem.  On the contrary, 
immigration to historically underrepresented regions might actually 
increase if states decide to create visa programs that are explicitly 
designed to entice immigrants to settle in depopulating areas.188  
Second, it is not necessarily apparent that this type of sorting is as big 
a threat to social cohesion as some suggest.  Professor Cristina Rodríguez, 
for example, has noted that: 
[T]he processes of absorbing [immigrants] into the body politic may 
ultimately benefit from a bit of regulatory competition or from population 
sorting in which immigrants settle in welcoming communities.  Such 
competition might make for better integration in the long run: immigrants, 
like citizens, will sort themselves out, settling where they are more likely 
to fit in and be welcomed into public institutions.189 
For these reasons, if immigrant admission powers were devolved the 
states, an increase in immigrant segregation would be unlikely to occur.  
And even if it did occur, it would not necessarily be a cause for concern.  
3. The Question of Amnesty 
Finally, another benefit of this Article’s proposal is that states could 
choose whether to provide a permanent visa—and, eventually, the 
citizenship that follows—to undocumented immigrants already in the 
country.190  But as this would likely be a particularly politically-charged 
 
supra note 11, at 407 (warning that, if states were allowed a greater say in refugee resettlement, “it is all 
too easy to imagine lawmakers seeking to appeal to voters by engaging in ever more draconian measures 
against vulnerable asylee and refugee populations in their states”).  
 187. Of the 22 million noncitizen immigrants living in the United States in 2018, 54% lived in just 
four states: California, Texas, Florida, and New York. In comparison, those same four states represent 
just 33% of the total U.S. population.  In fact, 80% of non-citizen immigrants live in just 14 states, and 
90% live in just 23 states.  Again, for comparison, those states represent 61% and 79% of the total U.S. 
population, respectively.  Perhaps even more shockingly, 51% of noncitizen immigrants live in just eight 
metropolitan areas: New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Houston, Chicago, Dallas, and 
Washington, D.C. Together, these cities only represent about 28% of the total U.S. population. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 179. 
 188. See Mathema, Svajlenka & Hermann, supra note 88; See also Jagow, supra note 12, at 1292 
(noting that Canada’s “Provincial Nominee Program has proved essential because it helps to spread out 
the benefits of immigration to all provinces and territories instead of just to major cities, like Toronto, 
Montreal and Vancouver.”).  
 189. Rodríguez, supra note 11, at 639.  
 190. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
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issue, it is worth briefly examining in more detail how that would work.  
Even under this proposal, it is expected that the federal government 
would continue to be responsible for running background checks on those 
to whom the states have decided to issue visas.191  This raises a difficult 
question as to whether an individual unlawfully in the United States could 
pass such a background check.  
Congress would almost certainly have to deal with this issue in the 
same legislation used to create this new program. It could do so in several 
ways.  First, to make this Article’s proposal as effective as possible, 
Congress could expressly legislate that an unlawful crossing or visa 
overstay, by itself, would not be enough to deny a subsequent permanent 
visa to an immigrant if that immigrant has otherwise been approved for a 
visa by a state.  In other words, entering or remaining in the United States 
without a visa would still be illegal, and an undocumented immigrant 
could still be deported by the United States if they are unable to obtain a 
visa from any of the states, but a state could provide visas and a path to 
citizenship to undocumented immigrants if it wanted to, without 
interference from the federal government.  
Alternatively, Congress could provide discretion to federal officials 
within the Department of Homeland Security to decide, on a case-by-case 
or class-by-class basis, whether undocumented applicants should pass 
their background checks.  This raises significant concerns about arbitrary 
decision-making at the federal level, but may be more politically palatable 
to a federal government that is often hesitant—if not downright 
resistant—to divesting itself of its own power.  Under this scenario, one 
presidential administration could permit certain favorable classes of 
undocumented immigrants (agricultural workers, Dreamers, or foreign 
students graduating from U.S. colleges, for example) to pass their 
background checks and obtain permanent visas from a state that 
authorized visas to such individuals, while still vetoing permanent 
immigration status for other undocumented immigrants, regardless of the 
willingness of certain states to authorize permanent visas for those 
individuals.  A later presidential administration, on the other hand, could 
reverse course and prohibit any undocumented immigrants from 
obtaining a permanent visa, regardless of the desires of individual states.  
Although far from ideal, this would still be a big step forward from the 
status quo, in which some eleven million people are living in an endless 
legal limbo, because it would at least allow for the possibility of 
occasional relief for some subset of the undocumented population.192  
Third, Congress could of course delegate immigrant admission powers 
 
 191. See supra note 94. 
 192. See supra note 115.  
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to the states while simply prohibiting them from providing any permanent 
visas to undocumented immigrants.193  While this would leave the biggest 
immigration issue in the United States unresolved, this Article’s proposal 
would still be valuable even if political realities meant that states were 
prevented from engaging in any conduct that resembled an amnesty 
program.  After all, this proposal is most likely, in the long-term, to lead 
to higher levels of legal immigration, which is itself a partial solution to 
the problem of illegal border crossings and visa overstays.194  In other 
words, the benefits of the proposal do not live or die on the question of a 
path to legal citizenship.  
CONCLUSION 
The United States immigration system is “broken.”  Or, at least, so says 
Donald Trump,195 Barack Obama,196 George W. Bush,197 Hillary 
Clinton,198 Mitt Romney,199 John McCain,200 Nancy Pelosi,201 and Paul 
Ryan,202 to name just a few bipartisan critics of the status quo.  
Acknowledging the problem over and over again, however, has not led 
to any concrete reforms, even though many possible solutions—or, at 
least, plausible ideas worth trying—exist.  If the political will to enact 
 
 193. Even if this were the case, one would hope Congress would still allow states to provide 
temporary visas (which come with no possibility of citizenship) for undocumented immigrants, as two 
recent proposals have called for.  See Agricultural Guestworker Act, H.R. 4092, 115th Cong. (2018); Farm 
Workforce Modernization Act, H.R. 5038, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 194. See supra note 116. 
 195. President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/. 
 196. President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-
union-address.  
 197. N.Y. Times, George W. Bush on Immigration: ‘The System Is Broken’, YOUTUBE (Jul. 10, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flWaojCCqXA. 
 198. Immigration Reform, HILLARY CLINTON, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/immigration-
reform/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
 199. Ezra Klein, Mitt Romney’s Immigration Plan: The Full Text, WASH. POST (June 22, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/06/22/mitt-romneys-immigration-plan-the-full-
text/. 
 200. John McCain, U.S. Sen. John McCain: Will Support Policies to Grow the Economy and 
Alleviate Some Financial Strain on Arizona Families , TUCSON.COM (Jan. 6, 2013), 
https://tucson.com/news/opinion/jobs-gun-violence-immigration-top-agenda-for-our-senators-
representatives/article_f80445b2-3819-56f5-9d10-7f812f1e408c.html. 
 201. Bloomberg Businessweek, Pelosi ‘Not Giving Up Hope’ on Immigration Overhaul, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2014-12-04/pelosi-not-giving-
up-hope-on-immigration-overhaul-video. 
 202. Sandra McElwaine, Immigration’s Odd Couple: Two Puerto Rican Congressmen Forge a 
Deal, THE DAILY BEAST (Jul. 11, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/immigrations-odd-couple-two-
puerto-rican-congressmen-forge-a-deal. 
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such changes cannot be found at the federal level, states should be given 
an opportunity to step into the breach.  After all, “[i]t is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”203  By devolving 
immigrant admission powers to the states, paralyzed politicians could 
finally find their way out of the immigration labyrinth, and could finally 
cut the Gordian knot that is the modern U.S. immigration regime.  
 
 203. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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